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A Canadian Meets the Magyars 
Watson Kirkconnell 
My acquaintance with things Hungarian dates from my accep-
tance in 1922 of a professorial post in Wesley College, Winnipeg. Born 
of largely Scottish ancestry in Port Hope, Ontario, and educated (Pri-
marily in classics) at Queen's and Oxford, I had had no previous 
contact with any Magyars. This was not surprising, for by the 1911 
census there were fewer than 10,000 Hungarians in the whole of 
Canada and most of these were pioneer farmers in Saskatchewan. 
Change soon came, however. The 1921 census figure of 13,181 rose to 
40,582 in 1931 and to 54,598 in 1941. Some of the rise may have been 
due to natural increase, bui more of it came from massive immigration 
brought in by such agencies as the C.P.R. and C.N.R. Colonization 
Departments and the British Land Settlement Corporation. Many of 
these migrants had to have passports from the Succession States but 
gladly affirmed their true national origin for the Canadian census-
takers in 1931 and 1941. 
In my 18 professional years in Winnipeg (1922-40), my contacts 
with the Hungarian community were chiefly through the Kanadai 
Magyar Ujsag [Canadian Hungarian News],* and the Royal Hungar-
ian Consulate, opened in 1928 under Stephen J. Schefbeck (Petenyi), 
later followed by Dr. Louis Szelle in 1936. 
In 1925-28, the entire margin of my time (beyond professorial 
duties) was being devoted to verse translation from a wide range of 
European languages. From this activity there issued my Outline of 
European Poetry (published serially in the Western Home Monthly, 
(June-November 1927), my European Elegies (Graphic Press, 1928), 
and in 1930 The North American Book of Icelandic Verse (Carrier & 
Isles, pp. 228), the first in a projected series of volumes planned for the 
whole spectrum of Europe's poetic literatures. Over two decades later, 
this volume was to make me a Knight Commander of the Order of the 
Icelandic Falcon, but that is another story. 
Enter B61a Bdchkai Payerle, the 24-year-old editor of the Kanadai 
Magyar Ujsag, who had encountered my translations from Magyar in 
European Elegies and the Western Home Monthly and now sought to 
encourage me to make The North American Book of Magyar Verse 
the next in my colossal series. He had been born in Ujvidek (Neusatz, 
Novi Sad), and had studied Greek in Budapest under Professor Karl 
Ker^nyi (d. 1973) and engineering at the Budapest Polytechnic. Since 
the half-million Magyars in the southern districts where his father had 
*Founded about 1920 in Kipling, Saskatchewan, by Miklos Istv^nffy (editor) and 
Zoltan Istvanffy (printer) and moved to Winnipeg soon thereafter. It was taken 
over in December 1924 by the Immigrants' Aid Bureau. 
been High Commissioner in 1918 were presently handed over to a new 
"Jugoslavia" in the peace treaties, the Payerle family all migrated to 
Canada.** 
For the project that he urged, I had Arthur Yolland's excellent 
Hungarian-English dictionary and Kont's Petite grammaire hongroise. 
For originals I had a superb two-volume anthology of Hungarian 
poets (Magyar koltok, 1928), edited by Aladdr Zlinszky and Ldszlo 
Vajtho. For background reading, I had Jeno Pinter's two-volume 
History of Hungarian Literature, also freshly published (in Magyar) in 
1928. With Bela to help me in deciphering the fundamental meaning of 
the Magyar, and with my own flair and passion for recreating the lines 
in English, the Hungarian anthology in English took shape with exhil-
arating rapidity. 
Actually, the completion of a large book manuscript was the least 
of our problems. The Great Depression had seen the financial sky fall 
down in November 1929. My publishers, Carrier & Isles, went bank-
rupt in the summer of 1930, leaving me to pay the printers and binders 
of my Icelandic Verse out of my own professorial pocket. Two of my 
other publishers, Graphic Press and Ariston Press, also went to the 
wall. Further book publication seemed as remote as Australia. As 
early as October 1929, the eminent Budapest novelist and academi-
cian, Ferencz Herczeg, had promised me an Introduction, but this 
solved no financial problems. 
In the meantime, a number of my verse translations were 
published in the Kanadai Magyar Ujsag. Next, about Christmas 1930, 
I mailed a clutch of nine poems to Sir Bernard Pares, editor of the 
University of London's Slavonic and East European Review. Included 
were a number in the Greek classical metres that were long popular in 
Hungary, in this case, Ferenc Kazinczy's "Our Tongue" (epic hexa-
meters), Benedek Virag's "Invocation" (alcaics), Daniel Berzsenyi's 
"My Lot" (sapphics) and "Invocation" (alcaics) and Karoly Kisfaludy's 
"Mohacs" (elegiac couplets). In more modern metres were poems by 
Endre Ady, Dezs6 Kosztoldnyi, "Mikl<5s Bard" and Geza Gyoni. Sir 
Bernard's 6-page answer of January 17, 1931, was full of enthusiasm: 
"Your sapphics are real sapphics, not the kind of jingle which passes 
for sapphics in England. It is of course, as you have made it, a 
**Typical of our contacts with another phase of the Magyar tradition was a 
dinner-party for six at the home of the Schefbeck-Pete'nyis in the early 1930s, 
when I and my bride (a Canadian cousin of Earl Kitchener) were fellow-guests 
along with Bela and his bride, Lulu Putnik (a Winnipeg pianist, fresh from study in 
Paris and a Budapest recital), as well as Lulu's uncle Dezso Mahalek (soon to be 1st 
cellist in the Vancouver Symphony) and his wife, the golden soprano, "Carrie 
Henderson." Other Hungarian musicians, who were our house-guests during my 
presidency at Acadia University in 1948-64 were Joseph Szigeti (violinist), Bela 
Boszormenyi-Nagy (pianist) and Ge'za de Kresz (founder of the Hart House String 
Quartet) with his wife, "Norah Drewett" (concert pianist). 
five-foot line . . . . Also I think your alcaics and hexameters are 
good." There followed a good deal of prosodic counsel on how to 
avoid the overloading of unaccented syllables with clotted conson-
ants. Publication followed promptly in March 1931 (Vol. IX, No. 27). 
The Slavonic and East European Review had a considerable 
circulation in Hungary, and I presently awoke to find myself famous 
in academic circles there. A literary academy, the Petofi Society, 
elected me to honorary membership on the Ides of March, 1932, along 
with Fredrik Book of the Swedish Academy. My sz^kfoglald, or 
inaugural dissertation, entitled "The Significance of Petofi from the 
Point of View of the New World", was duly read in the hall of the 
Royal Hungarian Academy of Sciences in November 1932. 
Meanwhile, publication slowly became a possibility. When Lord 
Rothermere visited Winnipeg in May 1932, I had lunch with him and 
secured a promise of $200 to buy book paper. The Hungarian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs voted 1,000 pengds {about $500) to buy 
500 copies of my volume for distribution to Hungarian schools. Mr. 
Schefbeck, the Hungarian consul, made a cash contribution. B£la 
Bachkai Payerle linotyped and printed the volume gratis with his own 
hands. Finally, entitled The Magyar Muse, the 228-page volume 
became available to the public in January 1933. 
Then came a tidal wave of friendly letters and autographed books 
from poets and scholars in Hungary. Among names in my files from 
the first few months were those of Lajos Aprily, Mihaly Babits, Eugen 
Balogh (Secretary of the Hungarian Academy), Aladar Ban, Aladar 
Bodor, George Buday, Minka Czobel, Lajos Harsdnyi, Istvan Havas, 
Ferencz Herczeg, Balint Homan (Minister of Education), Odon Jakab, 
Dezs6 Kosztolanyi, Ferenc Kozma, Ge'za Lamp^rth, "Laszlo Me'cs", 
Gyula Pekar, George de Pil^szy, Jen<5 Pinter, Miklos Radnoti, Sandor 
Reme'nyik, Gyula Szekfu, Ern<5 Sze'p, K^lm^n Szily (Secretary of 
State), Istvan Traub and Gyula Wlassics. 
With the Magyar volume in my European translation series duly 
achieved, I turned next to an anthology of my translations from Polish 
poetry. Here again there was the trial flight of a "Polish Miscellany" in 
the Slavonic Review and, after considerable delay, the publication of 
a Golden Treasury of Polish Lyrics (1936), made possible by heavy 
purchases of this work by the Polish Government. As a sequel came 
my decoration as a Knight Officer of the Order of Polonia Restituta 
and my receipt of the Silver Laurel of the Polish Academy of Litera-
ture. 
But the Hungarian friends had other plans for me. Dr. Dominic 
Szent-Ivanyi, the young scion of an old Transylvanian family and a 
career diplomat in the U.S.A., helped to found in Cleveland, Ohio, a 
Benjamin Franklin Bibliographical Society, whose raison d'etre was 
the publication of a series of books by Magyar authors. The proposed 
first volume was an English verse translation of Hungary's greatest 
epic, Buda halala ("The Death of Buda", 1864), by Janos Arany 
(1817-82). I was to do the versifying and the Payerles were to supply 
me with a literal prose text. There was to be a Foreword by Ge'za 
Voinovich, Secretary General of the Hungarian Academy. Dr. Arp^d 
Berczik, of the University of Budapest, would supply copious notes 
(the first in English). Dr. Joseph Szentkirdlyi, of the University of 
Budapest's Department of English, would check my translation with 
the original Magyar, line by line. I myself was to write an historical 
and critical introduction for this first translation of the epic into any 
language other than Czech and German. Complete sets (in Magyar, 16 
volumes) of Arany, Vorosmarty and Pet<5fi now graced my shelves 
and widened my horizons. The Kirkconnell-Payerle version of The 
Death of King Buda came out on schedule in 1936. A grateful consul 
assured me that an Order of Merit would have been recommended 
had not the presence of a Regent (Horthy) instead of the legitimate 
Habsburg monarch rendered all decorations impossible. The king was 
the fount of honour and, thanks to the Succession States, who 
immediately mobilized their armies whenever any restoration of the 
throne was suggested, Hungary had no king. 
The B.F.B.S.'s second volume was to have been an enlarged and 
revised edition of the Magyar Muse. The choice of poems, trebling the 
size of the volume, was to be made by Dr. Eleme'r Csaszar, professor 
of Hungarian literature in the University of Budapest, and by Dr. 
Laszlo Vajtho, professor of contemporary literature in the University 
of Debrecen. The Bachkai-Payerles and Joseph Szentkiralyi were to 
play the same roles as for Arany's epic. We all set to work and the 
entire manuscript had been industriously completed by the summer of 
1938. 
In the meantime, however, the Cleveland firm had suddenly 
switched its priorities. Dr. Dominic Kos^ry, a young professor of 
history in the Eotv6s Kollegium, Budapest, was writing a History of 
Hungary in Magyar, and an English translation of this prose work 
(482 pages) was to precede the enlarged Muse. Here my own contri-
bution was to be my final vetting of the English text in the summer of 
1940. Kosary's volume was published in 1941, just before the firm 
went out of existence, a casualty of World War II. 
But from 1936 on, interim use was found for the rapidly growing 
mass of Muse II. Bela, operating in Winnipeg, founded a literary 
monthly called The Young Magyar-American, with a considerable 
circulation in both Canada and the U.S.A. With pecuniary interrup-
tions, it ran from March 1936 to May 1939, and every issue carried a 
newspaper-sized page of our translations. During that period, it 
published 140 of my English versions (including a whole instalment of 
Toldi), 14 historical or critical articles from my pen and instalments of 
a Primer of Hungarian that I had written. Three further generous 
instalments of "A Magyar Miscellany" also appeared in the Slavonic 
Review 
Still another outlet had come with the founding in Budapest of an 
English-language literary review, The Hungarian Quarterly (Vol. 1, 
No. 1, Spring 1936). An opening article by Count Stephen Bethlen 
tells of its genesis: "Returning, two years ago, from a lecturing tour in 
England, I brought with me the sorrowful conviction that for all the 
sympathy and kindness which had met me at every turn, the great 
problems, past and present, of my own country were a sealed book to 
the majority of the English people . . . . Led by these considerations, 
a few friends and myself resolved to found a periodical which, written 
in English throughout, would give British and American readers a 
faithful picture of Hungarian affairs past and present. With this aim in 
view a Society was formed which honoured me by offering me its 
chairmanship and intends a few weeks hence to issue the first issue of a 
review entitled "The Hungarian Quarterly." 
The same issue carried an article by myself entitled "Hungary's 
Linguistic Isolation"; and some paragraphs of mine, printed facing 
some from Count Bethlen's article, were used as a publicity leaflet in 
launching the periodical. My excerpt began: "With the establishment 
of The Hungarian Quarterly, the English-speaking world is at last 
given an open window through which to gaze into Hungary's lonely 
tower of linguistic isolation. It will see there, not an over-delicate 
Lady of Shalott, weaving a futile web of fictive fantasy, but the vital 
personality of a gifted people." 
The editor, located in Budapest, was to be Joseph Balogh, a 
scholarly authority of Dante and Erasmus, and there were to be sub-
scription offices in London and New York. 
Subsequent contributions of mine, prior to the Quarterly's tragic 
demise in World War II, were "The Poetry of Ady" (Autumn 1937) 
and "Quintessence of Hungary" (Autumn 1938). 
Another literary academy, the Kisfaludy Society, elected me to a 
corresponding membership in 1936 and the P.E.N. Club of Hungary 
(whose president was Antal Rado, a classical scholar and a poet) 
awarded me its "Medal of Honour", a distinction then first inau-
gurated for eminent work abroad in the field of Hungarian literature. 
But there was a confidential talk of an impending honorary doctorate 
at the University of Debrecen, which was to celebrate in 1938 the 
400th anniversary of its earliest nucleus, "Debrecen College," founded 
in 1538 in this Protestant area of Hungary by Magyar graduates of 
Geneva and Leiden. 
The ceremony was scheduled for September 1938, and as a pro-
logue to that event I was invited to give a couple of lectures on 
Hungarian literature at the summer sessions {Nyari Egyetem) of the 
University. Transportation was not provided, but the Polish "Gdynia-
American Line" supplied free transatlantic tickets for my wife and 
myself, and I covered the remainder of the trip's expenses by sending 
back a series of travel articles to the Southam string of Canadian 
dailies. The Bachkai-Payerles (Bela, Lulu and small son Ferenc) were 
our fellow-travellers. For our six weeks stay in Hungary, a suite of 
rooms was placed at the Kirkconnells' disposal in the Eotvos Kolle-
gium, "the Eton of Hungary," in Budapest. 
Towards the end of our stay, we were urged to remain for the 
great Quadricentennial celebrations, but I had to decline, with a 
regretful "Nem lehet!" Being a full-time professor of Latin, I had 
classes to meet in Winnipeg in mid-September. As it turned out, in 
that month of the Munich crisis, the elaborate academic rites were 
called off. A personal letter from Count Paul Teleki, then Minister of 
Education, gave me the details (December 10, 1938): "We tried to 
keep the celebration on programme as long as we could. The great 
festivities were cancelled only a week before they should have taken 
place. It was in the first moment of great excitement and of possible 
war . . . . The anniversary was nevertheless celebrated in a simpler 
form by the University . . . . Your honorary doctorship was also 
announced." 
That the promised diploma took twenty months to reach me was 
due to the pains taken by the University to make it a memorable 
document. The University Orator was commissioned to prepare an 
eloquent Latin panegyric on my achievements as an intercultural 
interpreter. A superb artist, Alexander Kiss, was hired to lavish his 
chromatic skill on a large parchment, 28 inches by 20. Across the top 
was the national blazon, along with the elaborate scarlet capitals of an 
exordium, backed by intricate scroll-work, worthy of the Alhambra. 
Across the foot of the diploma were the richly-hued emblems of the 
several faculties—the rooster for divinity, the owl for philosophy, 
enthroned justice for law and a serpent-cum-chalice for medicine. In 
between, in arresting, hand-painted black minuscules, with scarlet for 
all capitals, stood the body of the citation. The capital-S at its begin-
ning {Si laus eximia . . . ) was expanded, as in a mediaeval manu-
script, into a vivid painting, 6 centimetres by 4, of a Hun warrior on 
horseback, turning back to shoot an arrow in Parthian style. This 
sketch, largely in scarlet, was a delicate reference to the subject-matter 
of my translation of Buda halala, especially the ancient legend in 
Canto VI. 
As a major document in these annals, the text of the diploma is 
given hereunder in English translation: 
WE, the Rector and the gracious and most famous Royal 
Stephen Tisza University of Debrecen, greet those who will read 
this document! If exceptional praise is deservedly due to those 
who are devoted to the welfare of their own fatherland and 
people, then assuredly those men are worthy of the highest 
admiration and respect who, studying deeply the literatures of 
foreign nations, set as their goal the establishment and promo-
tion of friendship and brotherhood between different peoples. In 
the noble circle of these men, by far the most eminent place is 
held by the most learned and famous gentleman, WATSON 
KIRKCONNELL, professor in Wesley College, Winnipeg, and a 
most illustrious member of many societies of letters among 
foreign peoples. For more than a decade now he has devoted 
himself to a study of the literature of our Hungarian nation and 
has published for his own nation an endless series of his 
translations and versions from the works of Hungarian poets 
and writers. His Hungarian anthology, rendered into English, 
and likewise his translation of "The Death of Buda," are monu-
ments that will demonstrate to all ages, more enduringly than 
bronze, the genius and poetic ability of this Man, not only 
among us Hungarians but also truly in his own fatherland. 
Finally, who could help telling how much this Man, a true and 
sincere Friend of the Hungarian people, had made known in 
annals and periodicals the culture and learning, the character 
and virtues of our nation, and how much he has toiled on behalf 
of our just rights! We therefore, out of respect for his eminent 
deserts, and in accordance with a decree of the most eminent 
Regent of the kingdom of Hungary, dated December 20, 1939, 
and as a sign of our respect, of our own free will and accord, 
have created, pronounced and declared the said most illustrious, 
most distinguished and most erudite gentleman, Watson Kirk-
connell, Doctor of Philosophy, Honoris Causa, conferring on 
him all the privileges and rights which Doctors of Philosophy 
honoris causa enjoy by right and custom. In proof of which, 
we have bestowed on him this Diploma, ratified by the great seal 
of our University and confirmed by the customary signatures. 
Issued in the free and royal city of Debrecen, May 3, 1940. 
THEODORUS F. LINC STEPHANUS KISS DE RUGONFALVA 
Doctor of Medicine, Doctor of Philosophy, 
Professor of Surgery, Professor of Hungarian History, 
Rector Magnificus. Dean. 
In less than a year from the time that I received this document, an 
endless procession of German troops and planes was streaming 
through Budapest on its way to the Rumanian Banat, and Count Paul 
Teleki (premier since 1939) had put a bullet in his brain (April 3, 
1941), leaving a note for the Regent that stated: "Perhaps by my 
voluntary death I may render a service to my nation." In the national 
descent to Avernus that finally hit hell-bottom in the German 
occupation of 1944, German S.S. brigades, aided by a few Right-Wing 
Hungarians, rounded up half a million Hungarian Jews and then 
deported them to Auschwitz for extermination. Antal Rado, who had 
called on me with the P.E.N. Club Medal of Honour, Miklos Radnoti, 
who had presented me with inscribed copies of two volumes of his 
poetry, Joseph Balogh, in whose book-lined apartment my wife and I 
had dined—all these gracious and cultured friends were slaughtered, 
as Jews, by the Nazis. Stephen Bethlen, with whom I had helped to 
launch the Hungarian Quarterly, went underground when the Nazi 
police occupied Budapest in 1944, but was caught by the Russians in 
1945 and seems to have died two years later in an NKVD dungeon in 
Moscow. In 1943-44, Bela Bachkai Payerle was involved in a crash 
program at the University of Indiana, training American officers in 
history and geography in preparation for occupation duty in Hun-
gary; but Roosevelt suddenly sold Hungary out to Stalin, the Indiana 
program was cancelled, and Horthy was informed that he could place 
no hope in a separate deal with the Americans and the British, but 
must make his peace with the Soviets. In October 1944, Dominic 
Szent-Ivanyi was Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary 
in an unavailing delegation of three sent by Budapest to Moscow. 
Later, he was "framed" in a political trial by the Rakosi regime and 
endured several agonizing years in Communist prisons in Hungary. 
Meanwhile, back in Canada, my academic employment had 
shifted from a professorship in Latin (Winnipeg, 1933-40) to a 
professorship in English (McMaster, Hamilton, 1940-48) and to the 
presidency of Acadia University (1948-64). I had also abandoned 
verse translation for active prose publication in support of the unity of 
wartime of Canadians of all origins. Books of mine with that purpose 
were Canada, Europe and Hitler (1939), Canadians All (1941), Our 
Communists and the New Canadians (1943), Our Ukranian Loyalists 
(1943), Seven Pillars of Freedom (1944), The Quebec Tradition 
(1946) and Stalin's Red Empire (1951). In December 1940, I was one of 
five founders of what is now the Citizenship Branch in the Secretary of 
State's Department, but declined the honour of becoming its first 
director, since, as a civil servant, I could then no longer speak out on 
public issues. One of my combative interchanges was in disposing of a 
claim, in Saturday Night (Jan. 9, 1943) by Steve Sz<5ke, editor of the 
Magyar Munkas, Toronto, that his paper, founded by the Commu-
nists in 1925, had nothing to do with the Communist Party. Unfor-
tunately for him, I had on file an official publication, Resolutions of 
the Enlarged Plenum of the Communist Party of Canada (1931), 
which specifically claimed (page 11) to have founded the Munkds as a 
revolutionary paper. 
The stifled Budapest uprising in 1956 against the Communist 
dictatorship brought nearly 40,000 refugees to Canada and made our 
public at least briefly aware of the facts of life in Eastern Europe. A 
few fugitive remnants of the AVO, dislodged on October 23, 1956, 
may have arrived in Toronto one jump ahead of the real refugees, but 
the great bulk of the new influx consisted of long-suffering citizens 
who were neither Communist nor Fascist. Many were college 
students, who made a vigorous contribution to life on our university 
campuses, as at Acadia, where Margaret von Fricke won straight A's 
in all her courses and Leslie TorOk ("Black Belt") began a judo club. 
I found the newcomers very friendly. A Hungarian Literary 
Society in Winnipeg made me an honorary member and Sandor 
Domokos, its president, created for me a bronze wall-plaque relief 
portrait of myself, "from a son of a small nation to a great son of a 
great nation." The Helicon Society of Toronto presented me with a 
large bronze medal, "In gratitude to Canada for the welcome accorded 
to the exiles of the Hungarian revolution, 1956-61." Meanwhile the 
Hungarian Freedom Fighters' organization in New York conferred on 
me its Gold Medal of Freedom, in company with some eight other 
"international champions of human liberty"—Charles de Gaulle of 
France, Premier Segni of Italy, Defence Minister Strauss of West 
Germany, Chancellor Julius Raab of Austria, Cardinal Cushing of 
Boston, Mrs. Bang Jensen of Denmark, Richard M. Nixon and 
Senator Thomas J. Dodd. The medal had been designed by the Hun-
garian sculptor, Mihdly de Keitay. The large parchment scroll (in 
Latin) accompanying the medal, had been deliberately burned around 
the edges so as to symbolize the martyrdom through which the Hun-
garian people had passed. Still another Magyar award was the George 
Washington medallion of the American Hungarian Studies Founda-
tion, conferred on me, along with Hans Selye and Marcel Breuer, at a 
1967 banquet at the Plaza Hotel, New York. 
From 1938 to 1968, my work in translating Hungarian poetry had 
been left on the back burner. There had indeed been my Little Trea-
sury of Hungarian Verse (1945), published in Washington by the 
American Hungarian Federation, from fragments of Muse II. For the 
Premonstratensian Fathers, of Saint Norbert Abbey, I prepared a 
volume of translations from Laszlo' M£cs, a canon regular of their 
Order, and saw them published in 1964 and 1968. In 1957, I translated 
spontaneously a poem by "Tibor Tollas," had the man himself as my 
house-guest in Wolfville, and Englished most of the famous freedom-
fighter anthology, Fuveskert. But most of my literary energies had 
been poured into a massive trilogy of Milton studies, begun in 1933 
and published as The Celestial Cycle (1952, pp. 728), That Invincible 
Samson (1964, pp. 229) and Awake the Courteous Echo (1973, pp. 
360); into a verse translation of Adam Mickiewicz's Polish epic, Pan 
Tadeusz (1962, pp. 407); into two volumes of verse translation from 
Ukrainian, made in collaboration with Dr. C.H. Andrusyshen, 
namely, The Ukrainian Poets, 1189-1962 (1963, pp. 530); and The 
Poetical Works of Taras Shevchenko (1964, pp. 614), into a volume of 
my own verse, Centennial Tales and Other Selected Poems (1965, pp. 
550); and into a volume of my memoirs, A Slice of Canada (1967, pp. 
403). All of these last eight volumes, totalling over 3,800 pages, were 
published by the University of Toronto Press. 
From the same Press, through its University of Toronto Quar-
terly, there had been published for thirty-one years my annual survey 
of all books published in Canada in languages other than English and 
French, totalling perhaps 2,000 volumes in all. While the great 
majority of these were in Ukrainian, Icelandic and German, the 
Magyar record was not entirely blank. Before this, I had already 
become acquainted with the poetry of Gyula Izsak, Sarolta Petenyi 
and Rozsa Pall Kovacs. The 1930's also brought biographical 
narratives from Rev. Monsignor Pal Santha and a short History of 
Canada by Gustav Nemes. But an up-to-date literary community 
really materialized after the great migration of 1956, and the founding 
of Kanadai Magyarsag and Magyar Elet in Toronto as vehicles for the 
outpourings of that community, presently gathered up in book form. 
Preeminent in this new wave in Toronto were Ferenc Fay, with several 
volumes of distinguished verse; Andras Tamas, whose Orzdm a hazat 
[I guard the house], (1961), is masterly and mature, and Marton 
Kerecsendi Kiss, whose Hetedhetorszdg: Mesejdtek (1962) is alight 
with imagination. Contemporary with these began the political 
commentary of Andres Tam£s, Delkeleteuropa a diplomaciai torek-
ve'sek sodraban 1939-44 kdzott [Southeast Europe in the Current of 
Diplomatic Endeavours, 1939-44] (Montreal 1961), which reminded 
me of Diplomacy in a Whirlpool (Notre Dame University, 1953), by 
Stephen Kertesz, whom I had met in Budapest in August 1938. The 
laudable growth of a whole circle of Magyar poets came with the 
founding of a Canadian Hungarian Author's Association (Kanadai 
Magyar Irok Kore, 1969), with a striking series of annual volumes of 
original prose and verse, entitled Antologia, edited by Janos Miska, of 
Ottawa and Lethbridge, and presently printed with the financial help 
of the Szechenyi Society. All contributors deserve to be cited, but 
under pressure of space I shall mention only Erno N&neth, Sandor 
Domokos, Ferenc Fay and Gyorgy Vitez. A celebrity in prose and 
verse who stayed briefly in Toronto before passing on was Gyorgy 
Faludy. 
I retired from Acadia University's presidency in 1964, following a 
bad coronary, and even from a subsequent professorship in 1968, 
following two cataract operations. As shades of the undertaker began 
to dog my septuagenarian steps, I turned back to a resumption of my 
old Hungarian studies. For this, the circumstances had changed since 
1938. My shelves were now crammed with scores of new volumes of 
Magyar verse, and especially the 3-volume Het evszdzad magyar 
versei (Budapest 1966, pp. 1131, 931 and 1136). Pinter's Irodalom-
tortenete was now supplemented by the monumental 3-volume 
Magyar irodalmi lexikon (Akade'miai kiado, Budapest, 1963), under 
the general editorship of Marcell Benedek. I also purchased a complete 
microfilm of the Latin works of Janus Pannonius from the British 
Museum Library. But the first undertaking was my completion of 
Arany's Toldi, begun in 1936 in partnership with Tivadar Edl of the 
Hungarian Foreign Office. Next I added excerpts from a dozen other 
epics by Janus Pannonius, Zrrnyi, Gyongyosi, Csokonai, Voros-
marty, Arany and Petofi. When I sent a copy of my projected table of 
contents to a score of knowledgeable Hungarians, many valuable 
suggestions flowed in. Dr. Asztrik Gabriel, director of the Mediaeval 
Institute at Notre Dame University, proposed a much fuller represen-
tation of poetry from before A.D. 1800. Dr. Dominic Szent-Ivanvi,.of 
Budapest, recommended a much more adequate array of poems from 
the Great Triad: Vorosmarty, Pet6fi and Arany. Almost all advisers 
urged a fuller roster of the poets who had risen to prominence in the 
forty years since I had published my Magyar Muse, especially such 
men as Dezso Kosztolanyi, Lajos Kassak, Milan Fust, Jozsef Erdelyi, 
Lorinc Szabd, Gyula Illye's, Sandor Weores, Attila JcSzsef, Zoltan Zelk, 
Miklds Radndti, Istvan Vas and Ferenc Juhasz. My chief mentors for 
this recent period were three emigre scholars: Dr. George Gom&ri, of 
Darwin College, Cambridge; Dr. Ad^m Makkai, of the University of 
Illinois; and Dr. George Buday, of Coulsdon, Surrey. 
The responsibility for the English versions was always my own 
throughout. Under the combined pressure of old age (pushing 78), 
coronary lesions and a work-desk suddenly swamped with several 
hundred pages of extra originals, I was deeply indebted in 1971-72 to 
the help on basic line-by-line meanings given me by my old friends, 
Lulu and Bela Bachkai Payerle, and by a new friend of the 1956 Emi-
gration, Maxim Tabory, of Kinston, N.C. But for better or worse, 
the summa manus on the prosody was always my own. My aim in 
translation has been to pursue two conflicting ideals: (a) to come as 
close as possible to the meaning and metre of the original, and (b) to 
produce English verse that is acceptable as English in prosody and 
idiom. It is the tension between these ideals that creates whatever 
merit (or demerit) my translations may have. 
In the spring of 1973, I sent a completed typescript of my Hun-
garian Helicon to the modern languages editor of the University of 
Toronto Press. His production staff reported that my 1180 typed 
pages would print as 848 large pages, at a cost of around $28,000. The 
Helicon Society of Toronto, the Szechenyi Society of Calgary and the 
Hungarian Literary Society of Winnipeg have all recommended it to 
the Secretary of State, Ottawa, for a multicultural grant in aid of 
publication. The manuscript is still on the knees of the gods. 
Franco-Rumanian Intervention in Russia and 
the Vix Ultimatum: Background to Hungary's 
Loss of Transylvania. 
Peter Pastor 
On March 21, 1919, the democratic Hungarian government of 
Mihaly K^rolyi collapsed and gave way to the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic. In that year of the "Red Scare" the rise of the B£la Kun 
regime strengthened the spectre of world revolution. 
With the fall of the Karolyi regime, Hungary's first democratic 
experience met an untimely death. The direct cause of the govern-
ment's collapse was the renowned Vix Ultimatum, a French-inspired 
memorandum from the Paris Peace Conference. The note, delivered 
to the Hungarians on March 20, 1919, by the head of the French Mili-
tary Mission in Hungary, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Ferdinand Vix, 
seemed to letimitize Rumanian occupation of Transylvania. The crisis 
this development provoked in Hungary made some contemporary 
observers, among them the American General Tasker H. Bliss and the 
South African General Jan Smuts, believe that Rumanian occupation 
of Transylvania was a scheme of the Allied Supreme Commander, 
Marshal Ferdinand Foch, whose plan for an Allied attack on Russia 
required the placation of Rumania. 1 Historians of this period came to 
accept this view.2 
Since the Vix Ultimatum was delivered almost one month after its 
issuance in Paris, the selection of the date of its presentation has 
remained a m y s t e r y . 3 Recent publications have offered various expla-
nations why the French chose March 20 as the date to hand over the 
fateful document. In Hungary, Professor Sdndor Vaddsz has sugges-
ted that Colonel Vix was ordered by his superiors to transmit the 
memorandum on that date because French military preparations to 
enforce it had by then been c o m p l e t e d . 4 Tibor Hajdu, the best known 
authority on the Hungarian revolutions of 1989-1919, believes that the 
date was chosen because the Paris Peace Conference was ready then to 
reopen the disucssion of the invasion of Russia. According to this 
thesis, the French military leaders were preparing the ground for such 
an invasion by handing the ultimatum to the Hungarians.5 In the 
United States, the present author has concluded that the date of trans-
mittal was an arbitrary decision of Colonel Vix to reinforce his waning 
authority over the Hungarians.6 
The opening of the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs for 1918 to 1929 in the summer of 1972 shed new and startling 
light on the affair. It is now evident that the Allied forces in eastern 
Europe under the command of General Louis Franchet d'Esperey were 
not ready to transmit the memorandum to the Hungarians in the 
middle of March. It was only on the urgent orders of the French 
Premier and Minister of War, Georges Clemenceau, that Franchet 
d'Esperey had it delivered then. Clemenceau's orders were prompted 
by a sudden crisis in southern Russia where Allied troops under 
French command were being defeated by the Red Army. To obtain 
quick reinforcements from neighbouring Rumania, Clemenceau had 
to pay off the Rumanians at once with the Transylvanian territory 
they coveted. Thus the Allied authorisation of the occupation of 
Transylvania by the Rumanians, and the fall of the K^rolyi regime 
were precipitated not by French intentions of attacking Russia but by 
the need to protect Allied troops already in the Ukraine. 
Direct French intervention in Rumania began in the aftermath of 
Rumania's defeat by Germany. In October, 1918, General Henri 
Berthelot was ordered to bring Rumania back into the war either by 
persuasion or by f o r c e . 7 Berthelot's French troops were part of the 
Allied Army of the Orient under the command of General Franchet 
d'Esperey in the Balkans. Berthelot was responsible to Franchet 
d'Esperey for his orders. With the approach of the armistice with 
Germany, which came one day after Rumania's re-entry into the war, 
Berthelot's responsibility was broadened. On November 2, he was 
appointed to command the Allied interventionist forces in southern 
Russia. For his activities in Russia he was directly responsible to the 
Minister of War and to the General Staff, but his military mission in 
Rumania and his troops in occupied Rumania and Transylvania, now 
named the Army of the Danube, remained subordinate to General 
Franchet d'Esperey, who was in command of the whole Balkan 
theater, Hungary and Rumania included. 
The division of Berthelot's responsibility indicates that for the 
French leaders the destruction of Bolshevism in Russia was more 
pressing than the political and military situation in the Balkans. 
Berthelot's task in Russia was the progressive invasion of Russian 
territory, including occupation of the ports of Odessa, Nikolaev and 
Sevastopol on the Black Sea and of Taganrog on the Sea of Azov. 
Inland his advance was expected to reach the Dnieper and Donets 
region where Allied detachments were to give advice and material 
support to the anti-Communist White f o r c e s . 9 
French intervention in Russia began on December 18 with the 
landing of 1,800 French troops at O d e s s a . 1 0 I n his zeal to find allies 
for intervention, Clemenceau even supported Rumania's participation 
in the Peace Conference as a minor ally. This was a volte-face for the 
French leader, who had earlier claimed that he could not accept 
Rumania as an ally because it had signed a separate peace treaty with 
the Central Powers on May 7, 1918. H On December 29 the French 
foreign minister, Stephen Pichon, announced in the Chamber of 
Deputies in Paris that the Rumanian army was being reorganized and 
ready to intervene in Russia. That a territorial bounty had to be paid 
for the Rumanian support was implicit in Pichon's view that the 
organization of the states in central Europe could not be based on self-
determination. France's aim was to create strong east European allies 
—a stance justified as the victor's right over the vanquished. Clemen-
ceau supported Pichon by stating that he pinned his faith on a system 
of alliances to preserve the peace of Europe.12 
Pichon's public statement was preceded by instructions to the 
French ambassador in Bucharest to express the French government's 
support for Rumania's presence at the Peace Conference as an ally. 
The Rumanians were being told that the Secret Treaty of Bucharest 
had been annulled by the Peace Treaty of Bucharest of May 7, 1918. 
Pichon, however, had promised the Rumanians that the French would 
ask the Allies to support Rumanian demands based on the Secret 
Treaty.13 Still, France's rejection of Rumanian claims rooted in the 
Secret Treaty of Bucharest was significant, for the Rumanians were in 
the process of advancing into western Transylvania, an area promised 
them in the Secret Treaty. The Belgrade Military Convention of 
November 13, 1918, between Franchet d'Esperey and the Hungarians, 
however, had clearly stated that it was for Hungary to administer the 
area unless the Peace Conference decided the fate of Transylvania 
otherwise.14 Rumania's advance was supported by General Berthelot, 
much to the despair of Colonel Vix in Budapest, whose role was to 
oversee Hungarian observance of the terms of the Belgrade conven-
tion. General Berthelot, who was in Budapest in January, informed 
Vix that he considered the Belgrade convention arbitrary and voiced 
his support for Rumanian expansion. To Vix and his superiors, 
Berthelot's behaviour seemed insubordinate. 15 On January 13, 1919, 
Franchet d'Esperey lodged a complaint that Berthelot seemed to be 
disregarding Clemenceau's orders and acting on his own rather than 
under his (Franchet d'Esperey's) command.16 Franchet d'Esperey 
buttressed his complaint by claiming that Berthelot's actions were 
weakening central authority in Hungary and would facilitate the 
progress of Bolshevism there. 17 
General Berthelot, who was aware of the assailability of his 
attitude, tried to gain Clemenceau's support by arguing that Rumania 
must be treated generously because of her proximity to Russia. 
Berthelot called the Hungarians the enemies of France and asked for a 
Transylvanian boundary unfavorable to Hungary which would also 
make Rumania pro-French and a virtual French colony. He also 
reminded Clemenceau that the Rumanians had re-entered the war: by 
doing so they had fulfilled France's wishes and, as a result, deserved to 
be treated as old allies. 18 What Berthelot was really seeking was 
Clemenceau's explicit support of the Secret Treaty of Bucharest. 
The French leader's reply was not long in coming. He expressed 
the view that the Rumanian Peace Treaty with the Central Powers 
annulled original Allied commitments to Rumania. She had also 
co-operated with the enemy with her annexation of Russian Bessara-
bia. Thus, he concluded, Rumania was treated very fairly when it was 
invited to the Peace Conference as a minor ally. As for the boundaries 
drawn by the Belgrade convention, Clemenceau upheld them as a 
military demarcation line. In support of General Franchet d'Esperey 
he called on General Berthelot not to act as a broker for Rumania, and 
either to obey his orders or request his own recall. 19 When Count 
August Saint-Aulaire, the French Ambassador to Bucharest, came to 
Berthelot's defense, the angry premier accused the general of sounding 
like a Rumanian statesman rather than an impartial judge of the 
Rumanian situation.20 
Clemenceau's heated messages indicate that in January, when 
French intervention in southern Russia was proceeding smoothly, 
even without Rumanian help, he took Franchet d'Esperey's warning 
seriously. The threat of Bolshevism and anarchy in Hungary forced 
Clemenceau to retreat from his previous stand on Rumania which was 
now seen as causing rather than stopping the spread of communism. 
Even Berthelot's strange reference to French colonial opportunities 
seemed to have little impact, but perhaps this was due to a general 
assumption that the Balkans would fall into the French sphere of 
influence anyhow.21 
The complaint about Berthelot's behaviour forced Clemenceau to 
reinstate his earlier orders delineating the areas of responsibility of 
Franchet d'Esperey and Berthelot. The former was in charge of super-
vising all armistices in eastern Europe, and was also ordered to see to 
it that the territorial status quo was not disturbed in Transylvania or 
elsewhere in Hungary. This explicit order was necessary since, despite 
the Belgrade convention, frontier changes were being made in 
Slovakia on Czechoslovak government initiative.22 
Clemenceau confirmed that Berthelot was chief of the French 
Army of the Danube in Rumania, subordinate to Franchet d'Esperey, 
and in charge of troops in southern Russia, where he had three French, 
one Italian and three Greek divisions under him. The Rumanians were 
to contribute as many troops there as Berthelot deemed necessary. As 
before, Berthelot was directly responsible to Clemenceau and Foch for 
his activities in Russia, but his supplies in Russia were in the hands of 
Franchet d'Esperey, who therefore also had some influence over his 
activities t h e r e . 2 3 
Clemenceau's critical attitude toward Rumanian expansion did 
not really jeopardize French influence in Rumania, for the other great 
powers regarded Rumania's aggrandizement by force of arms with far 
greater disapproval. On January 25, the Peace Conference adopted 
President Wilson's resolution against the use of armed force "to gain 
possession of territory, the rightful claim to which the Peace 
Conference is to be asked to determine."24 Next, the Supreme Council 
referred Rumania's territorial claims to a "Commission for the Study 
of Territorial Questions Relating to Rumania." The eight-member 
panel of French, British, Italian and American experts was to examine 
Rumania's claims on its four neighbours—Russia, Serbia, Bulgaria 
and Hungary. 
But the Rumanians disregarded both Wilson's call for peace and 
the new commission; they continued to advance into Hungarian terri-
tory. By February 14 they had pushed their front to the line of 
Mdramarossziget (Sighet) through Zilah (ZSlSu), Csucsa (Cuca) and 
Nagysebes (Sebej) to the Szamos (Someful) river. According to 
Franchet d'Esperey, their ultimate aim was to occupy lands southeast 
of the Tisza accorded to them by the Secret Treaty of Bucharest. Thus 
he saw war between the Rumanians and Hungarians as being near. 
The Hungarians fielded 5,000 troops to repel any further advance in 
the area of Csucsa (Cuca). To prevent a bloody imbroglio, the general 
requested his superiors to draw a demarcation line that would 
separate the two belligerents by a zone occupied by French troops. 
This was necessary, he argued, as the Rumanians' past, uncontested 
advances had whetted their appetite and they were now regarded by 
the Hungarians as deliberately violating the Belgrade convention.25 
The Supreme Council's Rumanian commission, which began to 
work out a frontier between Hungary and Rumania on February 11,26 
received Franchet d'Esperey's urgent appeal the following d a y . 2 7 It 
realized that in order to avoid conflict a neutral zone would have to be 
set up. The experts of the commission proposed the establishment of a 
zone which would put the Hungarians behind a line running ten kilo-
meters west of Vasarosnam^ny, the junction of the Kis Kortfs and 
Nagy K6r6s rivers, Algy<5 and north of Szeged. The Rumanians were 
to halt their troops ten kilometers east of Szatmirn&meti (Satu-Mare) 
Nagyvarad (Oradea) and Arad. 
When the Supreme Military Council took up the recommenda-
tion, the military leaders in Versailles suggested certain changes. On 
February 19, 1919, General Alby, Chief of the French General Staff, 
spoke of the military aspects of the zone. He said that in the light of 
the need to re-establish order, it would be wise to renounce the 
military convention of Belgrade and to draw a new demarcation line 
between Rumania and Hungary. He argued that the lines proposed by 
the Rumanian commission left in the neutral zone such important rail 
centers as Nagyvarad (Oradea), Nagykaroly (Carei) and Szatmirn£-
meti (Satu-Mare)—cities that conrolled Transylvania's lifeline. If the 
Rumanians were to fight against Bolshevism in Transylvania, it was 
illogical to deny them these communication centers. He also claimed 
that, since French troops were to occupy Arad, they could not occupy 
the other cities because Berthelot would have to send his troops to 
southern Russia. Rumanian occupation of the rail centers would 
therefore be n e c e s s a r y . 2 8 
It has been argued that the French military view of the shape of 
the neutral zone was an organic part of the military plans of the Allied 
Supreme Commander, Marshal Foch, who was intent on destroying 
Bolshevism in Russia. Indeed, by February 17, the French General 
Staff had circulated a seven-page "Plan of Action in Russia." The first 
step in this project was to encircle Russia. In the north, this was to be 
done by organizing a Polish army strengthened by the return of Polish 
troops from France. In the south, an allied force made up of three 
French, three Greek, one English, one Italian and two Rumanian divi-
sions would occupy the Ukraine and reconquer the Donets basin from 
the Bolsheviks. The second step included the organization of a Russian 
army from the prisoners of war in Germany and from Russian troops 
in France, Algeria and Macedonia. The last step was to be a general 
offensive that would enable the White Russian troops to destroy the 
Red Army before the winter of 1919-1920. The plan concluded with 
the observation that it was necessary to know how much support the 
Allied states were willing to give to the venture.29 It seems that con-
cessions to Rumania were motivated by Foch's wish to transfer the 
Danubian Army to the offensive against the Bolsheviks and to 
encourage the Rumanians to follow suite by catering to their designs 
on Transylvania. 
The question of the neutral zone was put on the agenda of the 
Council of Ten on February 21, 1919. In the absence of the leaders of 
the Big Four, the Allied representatives accepted the arguments of the 
military specialists in Versailles and requested them to work out the 
final details of the military plan.30 
According to the Supreme Military Council in Versailles, the 
neutral zone was to be policed by troops of two-battalion strength 
with some cavalry regiments to maintain order. The limits of the 
Hungarian withdrawal were a line "leaving the Tisza five kilometers 
northwest of Visdrosnam£ny, passing five kilometers to the west of 
Debrecen to three kilometers west of Devavanya and continuing west 
of Gyoma, five kilometers west of Hddmez5vas5rhely and Szeged, 
rejoining the old frontier south of Szeged." In this area the cities of 
Szeged and Arad were to be under French o c c u p a t i o n . 3 1 
The Rumanians were to have an eastern demarcation line that 
followed the main road from Arad to Nagyszalonta (Salonta) and the 
Nagyvarad (Oradea)—Nagykaroly (Carei)—Szatmarn&neti (Satu-
Mare) railway line. The three rail centers were excluded from 
Rumanian occupation but "were available for the use of Rumanian 
troops and Rumanians living in the areas controlled by the Allies, for 
economic purposes." The northern limits of the demarcation line 
followed the river Szamos (Some^ul). The Peace Conference adopted 
the final version of the plan on February 26.32 
Since the establishment of the neutral zone was a military matter, 
the decision of the Peace Conference was transmitted by Clemenceau 
to Franchet d'Esperey on March 1, 1919, for execution.33 On March 
5, the Allied Commander in the Orient informed Berthelot of the 
decision. Berthelot was to pass it on to the Rumanians but it was to be 
kept from the Hungarians. Franchet d'Esperey also requested 
Berthelot to ask the Rumanians not to act prematurely and to wait for 
Franchet d'Esperey to give them the date to move forward. Berthelot 
was to supply Franchet d'Esperey with information on the disposition 
of the Rumanian troops that would move into Transylvania so that he 
(Franchet d'Esperey) could plan a date for the Hungarian withdrawals 
to begin. Franchet d'Esperey also saw the need to inform Paris of the 
date of execution of the Allied plan. 
Franchet d'Esperey, who was weary of Berthelot's tendency to 
disregard his orders, told him that immediate responsibility for the 
French troops in Hungary was with General de Lobit in Belgrade, the 
commander of the French Army of Hungary. It was he who was 
empowered to handle the final details of executing the plan, which 
was to be supervised by an officer appointed by Franchet d'Esperey. 
With this in mind, Franchet d'Esperey warned Berthelot not to send to 
Hungary any missions that would duplicate the tasks of General de 
Lobit.34 
Franchet d'Esperey seemed to have been disappointed by the 
generous temporary demarcation line accorded the Rumanians. It 
appears that he had expected the approval of his proposed neutral 
zone, pushing the Rumanians back to their old line between 
Nagybcinya (Baia-Mare) and Kolozsvar (Cluj). After all, he did not 
believe in the Rumanian bogey of Bolshevism in Transylvania and had 
been opposed to French intervention in Russia f rom the start.35 
Having seen Rumania's unauthorized advances legitimized in 
Paris, Franchet d'Esperey began to assume that the memorandum of 
February 26 would lead to the permanent award of Transylvania to 
the Rummanian ally. He also believed that such a development would 
lead to war between Rumania and Hungary, therefore Rumania had 
to continue to mobilize to war. He felt that the Rumanians should 
organize eight divisions to face the six divisions that were allowed to 
Hungary under the armistice arrangements. Franchet d'Esperey 
warned Berthelot to make sure that the Rumanians did not withdraw 
troops from Bessarabia and Dobruja, leaving those areas vulnerable 
to attack.36 
General Franchet d'Esperey's concern about Rumania's prepared-
nedd in Bessarabia was occasioned by a sudden turn in the fortunes of 
the antibolshevik coalition in southern Russia. On March 1, Franchet 
D'Esperey had informed Clemenceau and Foch that contingents of the 
Ninth Red Army under Colonel A.I. Yegorov were advancing on a 
front stretching from Troiskaya to Pekatchevo. According to intelli-
gence reports, they were to be reinforced by the 20,000 men of the 
First Army supported by artillery.37 Thus at a time when Marshal 
Foch was looking to Rumanian intervention in southern Russia, the 
Red Army was threatening to carry the war into Rumania and 
recapture Bessarabia. 
The change of circumstances in Russia also brought a change in 
Clemenceau's attitude. When on March 1 General Berthelot formally 
requested his recall from Rumania, Clemenceau's reply lacked the 
acerbity of his communications in January. He told Berthelot that the 
situation in the east had become more delicate and for this reason he 
could not terminate Berthelot's mission. Rather, he suggested that 
Berthelot should come to Paris at a convenient time for an inter-
view. 38 
Clemenceau's temperate response to Berthelot must have upset 
Franchet d'Esperey, for he went out of his way to discredit Berthelot 
by blaming the crisis in Russia on him. He reported that, at a time 
when no reinforcements were arriving from France and the power of 
the Allied forces was being reduced by attrition, Berthelot encour-
aged Rumania's expansion in Transylvania. As a result, there was a 
shortage of troops in Bessarabia at this critical juncture.39 
By the time Franchet d'Esperey had filed his new attack on 
Berthelot, the situation in southern Russia had deteriorated further. In 
February the Allied troops had occupied Tiraspol, Kherson and 
Nikolaev. On March 10 the pro-Bolshevik forces of Ataman 
Grigoriev retook Kherson, and by March 14 Nikolaev had fallen. 
Soon the Reds were advancing on Odessa.40 
General Franchet d'Esperey proposed to his superiors in Paris a 
new line of Bessarabian defense along the Dniester river. He saw the 
need to put the Rumanian army and the Allied forces under a unified 
command and proposed General Berthelot for the job so that 
Berthelot himself might try to undo the errors he had committed. If 
Berthelot still failed, Franchet d'Esperey nominated General Degoutte 
to head a single general staff that would include the Rumanian army 
under its command.41 
On March 12, Franchet d'Esperey sped another telegram to 
Clemenceau about the Russian situation. He said he was aware that 
Berthelot was directly responsible to Clemenceau for Russia but, 
according to his orders of January 28, he was in charge of operations 
in the east and they were being threatened by the developments in 
Russia. The Allied commander stated that it was no longer a question 
of marauding bands of Bolsheviks but of well-organized and well-
disciplined troops under strong command who were imposing order 
on the chaotic situation in southern Russia. He added that local xeno-
phobia was eroding the morale of the Allied troops. The indigenous 
population was hostile to them and had shot many in the back in 
Kherson as the Red Army was approaching. He warned that repetition 
of such incidents in Odessa, a city of 900,000, could have dangerous 
consequences. 42 
Clemenceau's reply came the following day. He ordered Berthelot 
to deploy Rumanian troops in defense of the Tiraspol-Razdelnaya-
Odessa railway line, which was considered a vital link in Odessa's 
defense, and promised to send several battalions of French infantry to 
reinforce the city.43 On March 14, new directives cancelled Berthe-
lot's visit to Paris. Apparently Clemenceau also became convinced 
that Berthelot's powers should be limited. Thus using the excuse of 
Berthelot's complaint that direct communications between Bucharest 
and Paris were poor, Clemenceau relieved him of his Russian 
command. Provisionally, Clemenceau appointed Franchet d'Esperey 
to command the Allied forces in southern Russia.44 The contest 
between Berthelot and Franchet d'Esperey thus ended in victory for 
the latter. For the first time, all the Allied forces in eastern Europe 
were truly under the command of one man. 
The new emergency in Russia gave the Rumanians a fresh oppor-
tunity to pressure the French for concessions over Hungary. The same 
day Berthelot lost his Russian command a member of the Rumanian 
delegation to the Peace Conference, Victor Antonescu, sent a memo-
randum to Clemenceau stressing the obvious—the possibility of an 
attack on the Rumanians by the Bolsheviks. He asserted that, accord-
ing to Rumanian intelligence reports, the Hungarians had reached an 
accord with the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine and were about to launch 
their own offensive against Rumania. This claim was completely 
baseless, but it provided the grounds to argue that Rumania was now 
encircled and had become the last bastion against Bolshevism. 
Antonescu therefore requested stronger Allied support for Rumania. 
Having identified the Hungarians as allies of the Reds, Anto-
nescu's memorandum went on to complain of Franchet d'Esperey's 
slow handling of the Peace Conference's decision of February 26. He 
claimed that, while Franchet d'Esperey was looking for a suitable 
French officer to supervise the Peace Conference's order, the Hunga-
rians were stripping Transylvania and spreading Bolshevik agitation. 
These charges were also baseless, but they bolstered his request for 
immediate action to stop the Hungarians. Antonescu said that, since 
the Reds in the Ukraine and Hungarians were allies, a commander was 
needed to take charge of the Ukraine, Transylvania and Hungary. He 
suggested Bucharest for headquarters.45 
There is little doubt that Antonescu's candidate for the job was 
General Berthelot whose headquarters were in Bucharest and whose 
Hungarophobia was well known. What Antonescu had not 
anticipated, however, was that Berthelot would be relieved of his 
duties in the Ukraine on the self-same day he delivered his memoran-
dum to Clemenceau. Nevertheless, in the atmosphere of antibolshevik 
hysteria in Paris, Antonescu's unfounded accusations had their effect. 
That very day Clemenceau sent new orders to Franchet d'Esperey 
about the Peace Conference's February 26 decision. Using almost 
exactly the same words as Antonescu's memorandum, Clemenceau's 
new orders referred to the Hungarian's scorched-earth policy in Tran-
sylvania and urged Franchet d'Esperey to put the Peace Conference's 
decision into effect without further delay. Clemenceau also proposed 
to organize a mixed commission of French, Hungarian and Rumanian 
members to see that his orders were executed.46 
The reason for Clemenceau's sudden support for Rumania's 
appeal for the swift implementation of the February 26 decision is 
clear. In the light of Franchet d'Esperey's reports, it is unlikely that 
Clemenceau was taken in by the invention of a Hungarian-Bolshevik 
alliance. Rather, the French leader wanted to make sure that the 
Rumanians were rewarded for their intended support of the troubled 
Allies in southern Russia. The price for Rumania's loyalty was the 
speedy occupation of areas accorded to them by the Peace Confer-
ence. 
Franchet d'Esperey's first act as the new commander of the Allied 
forces in Russia was to ask Clemenceau to recall General Berthelot 
from Rumania. He claimed that Berthelot was fatigued and discour-
aged and should be replaced by General Degoutte. He again requested 
that the Rumanian army be put under his own command. He argued 
that only the Commander in Chief of the Allied Army of the Orient 
was able to oversee the whole eastern theater and could deploy the 
Rumanian troops in such way that the Transylvanian operation 
would not hurt the situation in Russia.47 
While Franchet d'Esperey was awaiting a reply from Clemenceau 
that would remove his nemesis from Bucharest, he went about fulfil-
ling the order regarding Hungary. On March 19 Franchet d'Esperey 
ordered General de Lobit in Belgrade to transmit the February 26 
decision to the Hungarians. At the same time, he appointed General 
de Gondrecourt to deliver the Allied demarche to President Mih&ly 
Karolyi. 
The boundaries of the neutral zone troubled Franchet d'Esperey 
as they troubled de Lobit, who as early as March 7 had proposed 
extending the zone to the Hungarian frontier in the Carpathians. Their 
reason was to prevent a Rumanian-Hungarian clash in Ruthenia, 
above the neutral zone designated by the Peace Conference. Franchet 
d'Esperey therefore ordered de Lobit to expand the neutral zone all the 
way to G a l i c i a , 4 8 including the city of Munk^cs (Mukachevo), an 
area claimed by Edvard Bene? for the Czechoslovaks. 
Franchet d'Esperey's order enlarging the neutral zone should have 
been cleared by the Peace Conference first, but there was no time for 
that. Clemenceau's order brooked no delay. So Franchet d'Esperey 
asked Clemenceau to have the change in the neutral zone approved by 
the Peace Conference ex post facto, and make it appear to the Hunga-
rians that it was part of the original Allied demand.49 In his eagerness 
to execute Clemenceau's wishes and to ensure that Rumanian troops 
would be available to fight the Russians and not the Hungarians, he 
wanted Clemenceau to present the Allies with a fait accompli. This 
way it would be the task of the Allies, rather than French troops, to 
coerce Hungary into accepting the u l t i m a t u m . 5 0 
Once the order had been issued for General de Lobit to begin 
putting the provisions of the memorandum into effect, General Fran-
chet d'Esperey embarked on an inspection tour of Odessa on March 
19.51 gut the order hit a snag, for General de Gondrecourt was not in 
Budapest to hand the memorandum to the Hungarians. For General de 
Lobit, time was pressing, especially since new complications had been 
reported by Colonel Vix: the head of the French military mission in 
Budapest had sent news of the visit to the Hungarian capital by the 
American military attache to Bucharest, Colonel Yates, and had 
warned de Lobit that this visit could have serious complications for 
the French. 
The American officer had met Karolyi on March 15 and the 
Hungarian President had complained to him about the unilateral 
French orders changing the Belgrade demarcation lines in Slovakia in 
favour of the Czechoslovaks. He also described the Rumanian 
advances in Transylvania. Yates had told Kdrolyi that the Peace 
Conference had granted Slovakia to the Czechoslovaks and that it 
might also take a decision in favour of the Rumanians. The Hunga-
rians, who had heard only rumors of the February 26 decision, thus 
had in effect been forewarned by an Allied representative what they 
could expect next. 
In conversation with Colonel Vix, Yates said that the embittered 
Hungarians would rather fight the Rumanians than accept the terms of 
the February 26 decision. He believed that in a conflict the Hungarians 
would defeat the Rumanians. He told Vix that for this reason he 
intended to ask Paris to suspend the Peace Conference's resolution 
until the Rumanians were strong enough to enforce it. Vix was rather 
upset at what he considered to be the American's meddling in affairs 
that were a French responsibility. 
When General de Lobit received his orders on March 19 to 
transmit the memorandum to the Hungarians, he told Franchet 
d'Esperey that Yates' talks with the Hungarians could inspire them to 
military resistance.52 
It is likely that it was de Lobit's fear of losing precious time that 
made him order Vix to deliver the memorandum rather than await de 
Gondrecourt's return to Budapest. Subsequently, Franchet d'Esperey 
approved de Lobit's change in the procedure as he (Franchet 
d'Esperey) reported to Clemenceau that the American might have 
given the Hungarians advance notice. 53it was undesirable to post-
pone the delivery of the February 26 decision when Clemenceau had 
ordered Franchet d'Esperey to transmit it as soon as possible. Swift 
execution of the memorandum was to protect French interests in 
Russia; the American's proposal could have had the opposite effect. 
When de Lobit ordered Vix to hand the memorandum to the 
Hungarians, another order of General Franchet d'Esperey was over-
looked. Franchet d'Esperey had told de Lobit to extend the neutral 
zone into Ruthenia, but de Lobit told Vix to deliver a memorandum 
that defined the neutral zone as it had originally been decided upon in 
Paris.54 Vix was told to present the memorandum on March 20, 
giving the Hungarians forty-eight hours to reply.55 He was also 
informed that if the Hungarians refused to accept the decision of the 
Peace Conference, no immediate measures would be taken against 
them.56 
Upon receipt of his orders, Vix contacted the representatives of 
the other Allied great powers and called them together for the 
morning of the twentieth. To keep the operation secret, he did not 
inform them of the purpose of the meeting. When they arrived at the 
French mission they were told that they were going to the Hungarian 
president's office to present the memorandum. When Karolyi read the 
document, he asked if he could call in his minister of defense, Vilmos 
Bohm, as the order seemed to be of a military nature. Vix suggested 
that the Prime Minister, D^nes Berinkey, should also be called in.57 
Vix's suggestion to call in Berinkey apparently reinforced the 
Hungarian's suspicion that the memorandum was imposing new poli-
tical boundaries on Hungary in the guise of military expedience.58 
Hungarian fears about the political character of the new demarcation 
lines were reinforced by the omission of Franchet d'Esperey's proposal 
to extend the neutral zone to the Galician border. Karolyi therefore 
accused the peace conference in Paris of allowing the Rumanians and 
the Czechoslovaks to expand across Ruthenia to establish a common 
frontier. Berinkey added that the lack of a buffer zone in northern 
Hungary between the Rumanians and Hungarians gave the 
Rumanians the green light to do just that.59 
Apparently Vix was unaware that it was precisely Berinkey's 
argument that Franchet d'Esperey had used in his request to 
Clemenceau to extend the neutral zone to the Carpathians. Had 
Franchet d'Esperey had more time to work out detailed military plans 
for the neutral zone, the likelihood of the Czechs and the Rumanians 
permanently linking forces in northeastern Hungary would have been 
reduced, the fears of the Hungarians allayed and the collapse of 
Kdrolyi's regime prevented. It is ironic that Clemenceau's desire to 
prevent a Bolshevik victory in the Ukraine led to the triumph of 
Bolshevism in Hungary. 
Whether Colonel Vix had deliberately encouraged the 
Hungarians to believe that the new demarcation lines were political, 
thereby creating a crisis that led to the rise to power of the Bolsheviks 
in Hungary is an open question in Hungarian history. Karolyi and 
Bohm claimed that he did. Nicholas Roosevelt, the American present 
at the encounter, saw it differently. Captain Roosevelt, whose task in 
Hungary was to gather information for the American plenipoten-
tiaries in Paris, claimed that Vix gave no such indication.60 Soon after 
the collapse of the Karolyi government, Vix denied the Hungarians' 
assertion in a letter published in a Budapest paper. In response, 
Karolyi refuted V i x . 6 1 In a recent article Dr. Hajdu claims that Vix 
implied that the Hungarians were right in assuming that the new 
imiltary frontiers were in fact political in nature.62 
Vix's report of the encounter with Karolyi and the Hungarians, 
which he submitted right after the meeting, belies the Hungarian 
claim. He considered the Hungarians' view of the political nature of 
the new demarcation line a Hungarian attempt to debate the issue and 
to stall implementation of the m e m o r a n d u m . 6 3 He suspected the 
Hungarians of trying to force a delay while Vix sought new instruc-
tions. But Vix was against any delay. Rather than giving the Hunga-
rians more time, he demanded their response within thirty, instead of 
forty-eight h o u r s . 6 4 The memorandum came to be known as the Vix 
Ultimatum. 
From Captain Roosevelt's report it is evident that Vix assumed 
that the Hungarian government would yield to French pressure as it 
had in the case of the Slovak borders. According to Vix's instructions 
from his superiors, rejection of the ultimatum would not have 
occasioned immediate reprisal. Yet Vix went on to threaten the 
Hungarians that in case of rejection he would be packing his bags.65 
This warning from the supervisor of the armistice was taken as 
tantamount to a resumption of warfare. Unbeknown to the Hunga-
rians, Franchet d'Esperey's orders had made Vix's threat a bluff. 
The Hungarian statement that no responsible government could 
accept an ultimatum that truncated the country simply seemed to Vix 
another ploy. In the months before the delivery of the ultimatum, 
when the Czechoslovak frontiers seemed to be the burning issue, 
Prime Minister Ka'rolyi resigned only to be made President. The new 
prime minister, Berinkey, followed a policy no different from his pre-
decessor's. Following the cabinet crisis of mid-January, Berinkey often 
threatened to resign in protest against compromises of Hungarian 
interests. When on March 21 the Hungarian government rejected the 
ultimatum and resigned, 66 Vix merely assumed that the new crisis 
would be solved by the formation of a new cabinet. The former 
minister of war, Vilmos Bohm, encouraged Vix's assumption.67 
Bohm, however, failed to inform Vix that the Hungarian leaders 
had a different solution for this crisis. Now they were working for a 
social-communist fusion government that was to seek an alliance 
with Trotsky's powerful Red Army. This coalition was expected to 
defend Hungary's integrity by force if necessary.68 I n the evening of 
March 21 a new "Revolutionary Governing Council" was created with 
Sandor Garbai as its chairman. Real power, however, was in the 
hands of the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Bela Kun, who as a com-
munist leader was expected to attract Bolshevik support for the newly 
proclaimed Hungarian Soviet Republic. 
Hungary therefore sought to retain Transylvania with the help of 
that army which Clemenceau wanted to defeat with Rumanian 
support. The Vix Ultimatum was to deliver Transylvania to the 
Rumanians as the prize for their promised support of the threatened 
French forces in southern Russia. In this imbroglio neither Hungarian 
nor French hopes were fulfilled. The Red Army was strong enough to 
defend Bolshevism in Russia but not strong enough to aid and save the 
Communist revolution in Hungary. The sole victor was Rumania, 
which was allowed to keep Transylvania under the Trianon Treaty. 
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Nikolaus Lenau and Germanic Literary Interest 
in Hungary during the First Half of the 
Nineteenth Century* 
Agnes Huszar Vdrdy 
The importance and utilization of exotic themes in the works of 
German and Austrian poets and writers became quite fashionable and 
widespread during the first half of the nineteenth century. This 
phenomenon was part of a broad intellectual and cultural movement 
in the Western (especially German-speaking) world, which was mani-
fested in a growing interest in the culture and folklore of the East 
Central European nations and other foreign countries. This movement 
had its roots in the eighteenth century in the "noble savage" concept of 
Rousseau and more specifically in the philosophy of the many-sided 
Johann Gottfried Herder. Herder's philosophy was a mixture of 
romantic and nationalist ideas, at the heart of which stood the 
glorified people, the Volk, which in his view were the sole possessors 
and carriers of the national genius. Herder believed that the national 
genius manifested itself in indigenous native cultures, especially as 
expressed through the medium of the mother tongue. He was therefore 
attracted by the folk songs, ballads and artistic expressions of all 
nations, especially those which had remained unspoiled by the new 
cosmopolitan culture and enlightened values of the West—the 
so-called NaturvolkerA 
The majority of the East Central European nations, including the 
Hungarians, could accordingly be said to fall into this category. The 
vicissitudes of their history had prevented them from reaching the 
level of material plenty and political peace necessary for the 
development and wider diffusion of cosmopolitan sophistication save 
among their upper classes. At the same time, however, their unspoiled 
indigenous cultural and ethical values stimulated a nostalgic longing 
among the peoples of the West, who lived amidst greater material and 
intellectual abundance. This interest was further enhanced by the 
Romantic Movement of the early nineteenth century which, besides 
drawing inspiration from the past, was also intrigued by the 
uncommon, the exotic and the unusual. One of the results of this 
search for the exotic was the renewed orientation toward America, 
where many a culturally and politically disillusioned European hoped 
to find Utopia; another was the famed "ex oriente lux" movement, 
resulting in the importation of Oriental themes. These movements 
directed the attention of Austrian and German poets to the East 
* This study is part of a larger monograph on Lenau which is to appear in the near 
future. 
Central European nations, as the nearest eastern countries with exotic 
and romantic peculiarities and connections. 
Specific interest in Hungary was first stimulated by the Austrian 
Josef von Hormayr (1781-1848) who was intent on furthering a 
common "Austrian" patriotism within the component nationalities of 
the Habsburg E m p i r e . 2 Hormayr was convinced that the history and 
cultural traditions of these nations, in addition to belonging to the 
individual nationalities, were also part of the common heritage of the 
Monarchy as a whole. He thus proposed that these traditions be 
treated as part of the whole spectrum, incorporated into a new form of 
Kaisertreue, (loyalty to the Emperor) and regarded as a kind of "Habs-
burg nationalism". Furthermore, in harmony with the ideas of the age, 
he proposed a shift in emphasis from the Emperor and dynasty to the 
peoples of the Monarchy. He hoped to accomplish this by encourag-
ing the literary treatment of each nationality's cultural past within the 
context of the common Habsburg tradition. 
While in retrospect Hormayr's ideas seem Utopian and unattain-
able under the aegis of nationalism, he soon found an eager supporter 
in the person of the Hungarian Baron Alajos Mednyanszky (1784-
1844)3. Similarly devoted to the unity and common traditions of 
the Habsburg realm, Mednyanszky pointed out (in Hormayr's literary 
journal Archiv Fur Geschichte, Statistik, Literatur und Kunst, 
(Archives for History, Statistics, Literature and Art) Vol. XVIII) that 
the cultural traditions of the nationalities of the Habsburg Empire are 
so diversified and rich that they are inferior neither to antiquity nor to 
the German Middle Ages. This was evident to him from the 
abundance of available material for dramas, ballads and novels 
which, stemming from the individual traditions of the varied peoples 
of the Monarchy, could be molded into a unique literature. Being a 
Hungarian, Baron Mednydnszky naturally based his argumentation 
mainly on Hungarian historical traditions, wherein he pointed to a 
wealth of material that easily could be utilized for literary adaptation. 
Hormayr's and Mednyanszky's initiatives soon produced a 
growing trend within the German-speaking literary world of Austria, 
which led to the adoption of various non-Germanic materials. Among 
these, Czech, and Hungarian themes predominated and gave rise to 
such historical dramas as Theodor Korner's Zrinyi (1812) and Franz 
Grillparzer's Konig Ottokars Gliick und Ende (King Ottokar's Fortune 
and Demise, 1825), Ein Treuer Diener Seines Herrn (A Faithful 
Servant of His Master, 1826) (about the Hungarian Bank Ban), and 
Ein Bruderzwist in Habsburg (A Fraternal Struggle within the House 
of Habsburg, 1848). Some of the lesser manifestations of this move-
ment were Caroline Pichler's drama Ferdinand der Zweite Konig von 
Ungarn und Bohmen (Ferdinand the Second King of Hungary and 
Bohemia, 1816), her novel Die Wiedereroberung von Ofen. (The 
Reconquest of Buda, 1829) and Carl Herlossohn's Der Ungar. (The 
Hungarian, 1836). 4 
A great number of the German-speaking poets and writers who 
turned to Hungarian themes like Karl Beck, Johann Nepomuk Vogl 
and Ludwig Foglar were born in the Carpathian B a s i n , 5 while others 
had various connections with Hungary, such as Adalbert Stifter and 
Josef Zedlitz. But there were some who had no such connections and 
were drawn to the country only because they were attracted by its 
exotic qualities. For the most of these Austrian writers, among them 
Heinrich Lewitschnigg, Moriz Hartmann and Ludwig August Frankl, 
it was the Hungarian landscape and its peculiarities which served as 
the "extraordinary" and acted as the necessary m a g n e t . 6 These writers 
and poets regarded the wandering gypsies, the forbidding betyars 
(peasant highwaymen) and the dashing hussars of Hungary as part of 
the exotic East, and the literary treatment of these figures afforded 
ready-made possibilities for them. It is to be remembered, however, 
that while the literary creations of those writers relied upon 
Hungarian scenes and themes, the results of their efforts were not 
Hungarian in spirit. This was almost universally true, even though 
some of these well-meaning writers—like Vogl, who dedicated a 
whole volume entitled Klange und Bilder aus Ungarn (Sounds and 
Images from Hungary) to the favorable treatment of Hungarian 
themes—travelled extensively in Hungary to gain first-hand 
knowledge about the land and its p e o p l e . 7 Yet, notwithstanding these 
commendable aims and strenuous efforts, their works were essentially 
unsuccessful. Vogl's literary accomplishments, for example, hardly 
ever surpassed the bounds of mediocrity. Neither his love of the 
Magyars and his affectionate treatment of Hungarian genre pictures, 
nor his somewhat strange custom of mixing Hungarian words with his 
German-language poetry, could compensate for his lack of poetic 
strength and for his inability to grasp and to give expression to the 
genuine Magyar spirit. His efforts were not sufficient to dispel the air 
of artificiality in his poems dealing with Hungarian themes. 
At this time German-speaking writers outside of Austria also 
began to show interest in Hungary. Many came to the country and 
wrote about their impressions and e x p e r i e n c e s . 8 Thus, similar to the 
epoch of the Turkish occupation of Hungary (16th and 17th century) 
when the country was known as the land of fierce battles and exotic 
adventures, the land of the Magyars once more became fashionable in 
the German-speaking world and its literature. 
The most talented Austrian poet who at this time turned to 
Hungarian subject matter was Nikolaus Lenau (1802-1850). Born in 
Hungary of German parentage, he spent his childhood and youth on 
Hungarian soil, completing his secondary education at the Piarist 
Gymnasium in Pest. The two years spent in the wine-growing region 
of Tokay, and the frequent trips to Mosonmagyarovar 
(Deutschaltenburg) subsequent to his settlement in Austria, afforded 
him the opportunity to get a close and intimate look at what can be 
termed as the "exotic" in Hungary. Hungarian peasant life, the lives of 
the betyars (peasant highwaymen) and the wandering gypsies greatly 
impressed him and he was fascinated by Hungarian folk songs and 
gypsy music. Since with his background he fitted perfectly into the 
Austrian intellectual climate of the late 1820's, it was quite natural for 
him to try his hand at gaining popularity through poems with 
Hungarian themes. His treatment of Hungarian subject matter, 
however, differed from the customary adaptations of this kind. Critics 
generally agree that his poems dealing with Hungarians themes are 
free of the affected and forced elements prevalent in the works of 
fellow German and Austrian poets. But after all, Lenau had a great 
advantage over them, for the impressionable years of his youth were 
spent in Hungary, leaving their mark on his emotional and intellectual 
world. Furthermore, not even the passage of time could obliterate 
these youthful impressions from his mind. He personally witnessed 
and experienced many of those aspects of Hungarian life which 
remained a closed book to most of his fellow German-speaking 
writers, who knew about these either from the romantic and largely 
misleading travelogues of their adventurous predecessors or from 
their own brief and superficial glimpses of the country. Thus, since 
these poets wrote about something known to them only through the 
accounts of others, they tried in vain to capture the spirit of a strange 
and alien world. Lenau, on the other hand, simply relived his past and 
drew freely upon the spiritual heritage which had become an inextri-
cable part of his own intellectual and emotional world. 
Consequently, as a result of his background and past experience 
with certain aspects of Hungarian life that caught his fancy, Lenau's 
poems are generally correct in detail, and the sum of his poems dealing 
with Hungarian subject matter presents a less distorted picture of the 
country and of Magyar national life than the poetry of his predeces-
sors and contemporaries. Yet, even Lenau was unsuccessful in por-
traying a balanced and representative image of contemporary 
Hungary. Like his fellow Austrian and German poets, he too utilized 
the same Hungarian images and figures and it is true that the gypsies, 
the talented carriers of both Magyar folk melodies and the so-called 
"gypsy music", the betydrs, the peasant Robin Hoods of the forests 
and pusztas and the csikoses, the tough herdsmen of the plains, are all 
Hungarian types. But they represent only a minute part of Hungary 
and the Hungarian world of Lenau's time. Like his fellow German-
language poets and writers, Lenau seldom, if ever, treated the other, 
larger part of contemporary Hungary. To him the peasants, burghers, 
the commercial classes and the various types of lesser and higher 
nobility (95% of Hungarian society) might as well not have existed. 
Naturally, Lenau and his fellow Austrian and German poets had the 
right to select those elements of Hungarian life and society which 
appealed to them. But in doing this, they presented an image which 
was not representative of Hungary as a whole, and thus did an 
unintentional disservice to the country. In their search for the exotic, 
they portrayed a relatively unimportant part of Hungarian life and 
overlooked the much more important elements of basic human values, 
beliefs and moral and political ideals which soon shook the very foun-
dations of not only Hungary but the Habsburg Empire as well. 
The stereotype view of Hungary which was propagated by Lenau 
and the contemporary German-language poets was further strength-
ened by the great influx of Western tourists and travelers in search of 
the unusual. It is clear, that despite certain differences in their 
approach, the foreign writers, poets and travelers recognized and 
wanted to recognize only those aspects of Magyar culture which were 
foreign to them and therefore could be classified as "exotic". They 
over-emphasized these traits, projected them over the whole country, 
and treated them as if these were the dominant characteristics of the 
entire Hungarian nation.9 As a result of these activities, the view 
presented by these writers and travelers about early and mid-nine-
teenth century Hungary became the conventional Western image of 
the country well into the twentieth century. To them Hungary 
appeared as the romantic land of the vast pusztas, wandering gypsies, 
gypsy virtuosos, ungainly betyars, intriguing music and intoxicating 
Tokay wines. That this view remained prevalent even in the nearby 
German world had been recognized by many critics. "What do the 
German people know about Hungary?" asked Professor d'Ester of the 
University of Munich in the 1920's. And he answered: "If a newspaper 
confronted its readers with this intriguing question, the answers 
would fail pitifully. Hungary—'O yes, of course, Hungarian dances, 
Hungarian gypsy music'—the man who appreciates music would say; 
'paprika, puszta—would be the reply of one who has a more realistic 
frame of mind. 10 
A similar view was expressed by the Hungarian Janos Koszo. 
"Every Hungarian who spends a considerable period of time in 
Germany," he said, "makes the rather unpleasant discovery that his 
homeland is still viewed in the romantic light of the early nineteenth 
century, which image has no relationship whatsoever to today's 
reality". 11 One might add that it never did reflect Hungarian reality in 
its entirety. 
That the stereotyped image of Hungary, epitomized above, is the 
product of the past century is beyond doubt. And it may be true, as 
some critics claim, that Lenau's role in the development of this image, 
though unintentional,is immense. Several of them hold him expressly 
responsible for these distortions and at least one, Zsigmond Szanto, 
even believes that it would have been much better had Lenau not 
written anything about Hungary.12 Szanto contends that if a poet 
who was born and educated in Hungary retained such an erroneous 
and one-sided picture of the country of his birth, then one can at least 
question his genuine interest and knowledge of the country. This is all 
the more so—claims Szanto—as the years of Lenau's poetic activity 
coincided with the great years of Hungary's national revival, when the 
resurgent Hungarian culture produced some of the country's greatest 
poets (Sandor Petofi, Mihaly Vorosmarty, Sandor and K&roly Kis-
faludy, Ferenc Kolcsey, Janos Arany, etc.), novelists (Mikl6s Josika, 
Mor Jdkai, J(5zsef Eotvos, etc.), and political thinkers (Istvan 
Sze'chenyi, Lajos Kossuth, Ferenc Dectk, Jdzsef Eotvos, etc.), most of 
whom apparently remained unknown or at least unimportant to 
Lenau. Through his treatment of Hungarian subject matter, he merely 
strengthened the already prevalent and grossly misleading view of 
Hungary as a land of primitive if appealing barbarism and a cultural 
and intellectual vacuum. Lenau, of course, was completely unaware 
of this, and he was rather proud of his part in again making Hungary 
familiar abroad. "What did people abroad know about Hungary 
before us?" he boastfully asked Karl Beck at their first meeting, clearly 
claiming credit for allegedly having placed Hungary once more on the 
map of Europe. But is this claim valid? Did Lenau, or Beck for that 
matter, add anything worthwhile to what was already known about 
the country from the well-meaning but naive writings of Vogl and 
others? Sz£nt6 does not seem to think so, and one must, in general, 
agree with him. Hungary had already been known in the German-
speaking world prior to Lenau's time as a productive but forsaken 
land of untamed Magyars who—so it appears—were either hussars, 
betyars or primitive swineherds. According to these beliefs, the sum 
total of the activity of these Magyars consisted of drinking, dancing, 
singing and drinking again; they were wholly untouched by the 
progress of time and civilization. In general, they had to be intoxi-
cated to be enthusiastic about anything. But once they became enthu-
siastic, not even the spilling of human blood could be a matter of 
grave concern to them. All in all, from the point of view of a civilized 
Western man, the most worthwhile things in Hungary were the good 
Tokay wines and the melancholic and fiery gypsy music. 13 
While they are not in the least malicious or consciously critical, 
many of the important elements in Lenau's poems dealing with 
Hungarian subject matter seem to agree with this assessment, and 
therefore they unintentionally strengthened this faulty and far-from-
correct picture. This is the reason why one of his most recent critics, 
Ede Szabo, questioned the validity and even relevance of Lenau's 
poetry to Hungary. Szabo' contends that they are 
already somewhat covered by the dust of time. Their external 
romanticism, the puszta, the betyar, (peasant highwaymen) the 
csarda, (wayside inn) the gypsy and others fail to present a last-
ing genuine image of Hungary. Moreover, not even in their own 
time did they depict anything but a partial portrait. 
Their value and authenticity is slight and too greatly bound to 
an age, and although some are marked by literary brilliance, for 
the present-day readers, they are mere curiosities.14 
What these critics failed to consider was that Lenau was a poet, 
and as such, he was more interested in writing highly-personalized 
impressions of his youth than in giving a more prosaic but balanced 
account of contemporary Hungarian society and culture. One must 
also keep in mind that, notwithstanding his one-sided presentation, 
Lenau's basic sympathies for the land and culture of his birth are 
evident in his imagery and the sincerity and immediacy in his 
treatment of Hungary and the Magyars. It was not his intention (at 
least he never claimed so) to present an all-inclusive portrait of the 
whole spectrum of Hungarian society. Like any other lyric poet, 
Lenau only wished to preserve some fond memories of his childhood, 
and at the same time use the imagery of these memories to portray 
completely unrelated emotions which filled his sensitive soul. Later in 
his life some of these images became associated with his fervour for 
the Hungarian national movement—a movement which he apparently 
never knew very well. To Lenau, therefore, Hungarian genre pictures 
served the purpose of imagery and they were not intended to portray 
his native land in all its meaningful reality. Thus his poetic works 
should be evaluated in the context of their artistic imagery. This is 
precisely the point that the above critics failed to take into consi-
deration. 
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Recent Publications in Hungarian Art History 
Reviews by Alfonz Lengyel 
Christian Art in Hungary, Collections from the Esztergom Christian 
Museum. By Miklds Boskovits, MikWs Mojzer and Andras Mocsi. 
(Budapest: Publishing House of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
1965. $14.50) 
Miklo's Mojzer presents a short but excellent analysis of the col-
lection at the Christian Museum in Esztergom, Andras Mocsi wrote 
the notes for the Trecento and Miklos Boskovits those for the Quat-
trocento periods respectively. The importance of the book lies in the 
fact that it introduces the Hungarian medieval masters to the English 
speaking public: specifically, it evaluates the works of Master Bat I., 
Tamas Kolozsvari, Master of Janosr^t, Master B.E. and Master M.S. 
The painting The Legend of Sta. Catherina by Master of Bat I. is a 
most unusual pictorial representation in that Sta. Catherina, a prin-
cess of Alexandria, appears on either side of the canvas which is 
divided by the image of a romanesque column. However, Master of 
Bat I. followed the Italian Quattrocento practice of including a 
Trecento icon within the composition. This typical Quattrocento 
representation is well documented in the book. 
Tamas Kolozsva'ri, the most celebrated painter in Hungary 
during the reign of Sigismund, followed the practice of the Italian 
early Quattrocento by placing the figure of King Sigismund, por-
trayed as a Roman captain, into the scene of the Crucifixion. 
The development of an Italian Renaissance in Hungary was not 
accompanied by the immediate demise of the Gothic influence and a 
dualism of styles prevailed for a time. This phenomenon is clearly 
apparent in Kolozsvari's altarpiece. Despite the strong Renaissance 
influence apparent in the picture, the miniature kneeling figure of the 
donor is presented in typical Gothic style, complete with medieval 
inscription. Such an inscription also appears above the head of King 
Sigismund; it is written in Latin, utilizing Gothic style letters and 
reads: "Vere filius die erat iste." 
Other artists such as Master of Janosret and Master B.E. followed 
the Flemish school, while Master M.S. echoed the great German 
Renaissance masters and Schongauer and Durer belonged to the 
Danube school. 
The Crucifixion by Master M.S. was painted in 1506 in a flam-
boyant Gothic style. The portrayal of a Turkish figure as the execu-
tioner is remarkable. This type of anti-Turk propaganda appeared 
often in art works after the Turkish massacre at Ottranto in 1480. 
(See: A. Lengyel: "Turken" in Lexicon der Christlichen Ikonographie, 
Vol. 4. pp. 391-392, Herder Verlag, Freiburg, 1972). 
It is notable that the authors present a well balanced cross section 
of the foreign masters. Starting with the Ducento through Taddeo 
Gaddi and Lorenzo di Credi several Florentine and Sienese Trecento 
and Quattrocento painters are also reviewed. Among others, Giam-
pietrino, Scarsellino and Carlo Crivelli are chosen to represent the late 
phase of the Italian Renaissance. Northern Italian and Umbrian 
painters and the painters from the Marche region and Romagna are 
also reviewed. 
In addition to the Italian Masters, the book introduces German, 
Austrian and Flemish painters. Thus the works of the unknown 
masters of Salzburg, Lubeck, Witzendorf and Brussels as well as those 
of several known masters (Crispin van den Broeck, Hendrick van 
Balen, Jacob van Amsterdam Cornelis, Johan Zick, Christian Ernest 
Dietrich) are discussed and the studio of Lucas Cranach the Elder 
receives mention. 
Due to limitations on the size of the publication, important 
Italian, German, Flemish and Dutch 19th Century masterpieces could 
not be included. In order to make the entire collection known a second 
and third volume would need to be published. 
Unfortunately, the analogies do not make reference to findings of 
western art historians. In order to supply the western scholars with 
sufficient data the notes on the page opposite to the colour plates 
would need more detailed iconographical, technical and analogical 
analysis. For the half tone plates the same kind of analytical notation 
would also be desirable. 
A muveszet Matyas Kiraly udvardban [Art at the Court of King 
Mathias]. Byjolan Balogh. (Budapest: Akademiai Konyvkiado, 1966. 
2 Vols.) 
This basic reference book, published in two volumes, has been 
long overdue. Dr. Balogh, inspired by Professor Antal Hekler, started 
this work in 1925. Through decades she carried out her untiring, 
zealous research which finally resulted in this extremely important 
compilation. The first attempt at publication was defeated by World 
War II. Dr. Balogh resumed her work in 1952, when her project 
became part of the research program of the Hungarian Academy of 
Science. Thus, the findings of the excavations in Buda and Visegrad 
after World War II were incorporated into the work. Her ultimate goal 
was to write a monograph similar to Francesco Malaguzzi Valeri's La 
Corte di Ludovico il Moro, but she also added a thematic catalogue of 
descriptive data. 
The first volume is divided into three parts. The first part deals 
with the documentation of the artistic and architectural remains of 
Mathias' epoch. The second part contains all documented data on the 
artists and artisans who worked for Mathias. In the third part Dr. 
Balogh introduces Mathias as a man of science and letters. I would 
have preferred a different arrangement in which part three and part 
one were interchanged, followed by those parts dealing with the docu-
mentation related to the artistic and architectural remains and their 
creator artists and architects. In the third part Dr. Balogh documents 
the education, personal development and ambitions of Mathias. She 
gives a clear picture of the culture of Mathias, his attitude towards 
religion, and his political connections. At the end of the volume she 
provides documentation on the activities of the members of the court 
of this great humanist king of the Hungarian Renaissance. 
The second volume is a collection of photographs of the most 
important archeological remains. The fragmentary documentation is 
grouped in the form of an archival catalogue, while the results of Dr. 
Balogh's specific research appears in the footnotes. In addition, she 
often makes comments and explanatory notes. For example, when she 
presents a catalogue type description of some architectural decorative 
remains, she footnotes the related Italian analogies. 
With this analysis Dr. Balogh provides a great number of ques-
tions for the future generation of Quattrocento scholars, not only in 
respect of Hungary but of Italy as well. 
The work should be translated into English. 
A Budai Var feltarasa [The Excavation of the Royal Palace in Buda], 
By Laszlo Gerevich. (Budapest: Akademiai Konyvkiado, 1966. Pp. 
352. Illus.) 
This is the first comprehensive book ever written regarding the 
excavation of an important Central European royal palace, which was 
almost totally destroyed by artillery fire and bombardment in 
Budapest toward the end of the Second World War. Two other 
important ancient Central European royal palaces, the Hradzsin in 
Prague and the Palace of Pozsony (Bratislava) are not yet entirely 
excavated and their archeological analysis is long overdue. 
During the late 19th century, when Hausmann was preparing the 
urban plan of Budapest, some remains of the old palace of King 
Zsigmond and King Mathias were discovered by accident. The 
excavated walls were recovered and the findings were removed to the 
National Museum. This important research work was not resumed 
until 1946 when preparations were made for a systematic excavation 
of the site. Laszlo Gerevich was placed in charge of the project. He 
used a technique of such precision as is known only to prehistoric 
archeology. The scrambled nature of the remains, due to several 
violent assaults on and destructions of the palace through the 
centuries, made this technique necessary. 
In recent years Gerevich published the most significant and 
important findings from particular layers. This gave rise to a dispute 
on the exact chronology and other pertinent data of the findings, 
mobilizing historians of Hungarian art, culture and architecture. With 
their aid Gerevich was able to come up with a definitive analysis 
covering all facets of the Royal Palace in Buda. 
In the course of the excavations certain parts of the palace were 
reconstructed and a "museum in situ" was erected. Over eighteen 
thousand artifacts and study material, consisting of architectural 
decorations and carved work, as well as doors, windows, and small 
statues, were placed within the museum part of the Palace. 
An important feature of Gerevich's book is the publication of the 
entire building plan. First he describes the results of work done in a 
particular excavated unit, then he correlates the results with the 
Medieval and Renaissance archives and new bibliographic material. 
His conclusions are compared with material covering the whole of the 
European Medieval and Renaissance periods. 
Gerevich's book will serve as a very important source for any 
further study of Central and Northeastern European fortified castles. 
One of Gerevich's conclusions is that, though similarities of construc-
tion methods were shared by Toscana in Italy and Buda, the latter is 
closer to the "Vorburgstadt" idea which was likely imported to 
Hungary by twelve and thirteenth century German settlers. 
Recent Hungarian research on Medieval church architecture 
proved that the Benedictine and Cistercian styles originated from 
Italy. This fact indicates a very strong architectural contact between 
Hungary and that country which was accelerated during the reigns of 
King Zsigmond and King Mathias. The reviewer is at present excava-
ting a small Augustinian church; the Santa Lucia near Rosia (Siena), 
and has found one meter and a half above the floor, triple Gothic 
starting ribs at the corner of the apse, similar to those discovered 
among the ruins of the Chapel of the Palace in Buda. It would be 
useful to extend research into this direction before we can fully accept 
Gerevich's theory of the Germanic origin of the architecture of Buda. 
Gerevich, with an excellent pedagogical instinct presents the 
photographs, diagrams and architectural drawings within the text 
itself, and brings together at the end of the book a series of selected 
illustrations related to the art and architecture of the Palace. 
The new methods of archeological excavation applied and the 
technique employed in utilizing related research, serves as a useful 
model and example for similar excavations. I strongly recommend the 
translation of the book into English, perhaps by UNESCO. 
Reviews 
The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500-1453. By Dimitri 
Obolensky. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Illus. $15.00.) 
A good number of excellent monographs have been published on 
the peoples who one way or another came into the sphere of influence 
of the Byzantine Empire in the Balkan or Danube area. Such are, for 
instance, Runciman's A History of the First Bulgarian Empire, 
Jirecek's Geschichte der Bulgaren and Geschichte der Serben, 
Dvornik's The Slavs in European History and Civilization and The 
Slavs: Their Early History and Civilization, Macartney's The Mag-
yars in the Ninth Century, and others. As their titles indicate, these 
works are mostly concerned with the development of these peoples as 
racial and national units; their points of contact with Byzantium are 
viewed only as one of its chapters. 
There are several works, on the other hand, whose main focus is 
the relationship of any one of these nations to the Empire. Among 
them we have Lipsic's Byzanz und die Slave: Beitrage zur byzanti-
nischen Geschichte des 6.-9. Jahrhunderts, Dvornick's Les Slaves, 
Byzance et Rome au IXe siecle, Darko's Byzantinisch-ungarische 
Beziehungen in der ziveiten Halfte des XIII Jahrhunderts and 
Heisenberg's Ungarn und Byzanz. 
The uniqueness of the work under review is that in a compact 
volume it brings together the interaction of all the peoples who, as 
foes or allies, affected the life of Byzantium in Eastern Europe, and 
were affected by it, from the sixth century till the end. Professor 
Obolensky seems to have been aware of the need for a book like this 
from the time he wrote the lively chapter for Vol. IV of the new 
edition of the Cambridge Medieval History. This book is a welcome 
and vast amplification of that chapter. 
The title itself of the work, The Byzantine Commonwealth, 
would be misleading if one does not read the introduction of the 
author in which he justifies it as an ambiguous translation of the 
ambiguity contained in the Byzantine terms used to express the unique 
relationship to the Empire of the nations which invaded its eastern 
European territory. Actually, the book embraces more than that area; 
it goes further: to the Caucasus and the Russian southern steppe belt 
whose inhabitants held the access to the Balkans and whose friendship 
the Byzantines assiduously cultivated. Later on, the Russians also 
entered the Byzantine sphere of influence, as Professor Obolensky 
competently discusses the point, and thus had a place in the Byzantine 
Commonwealth. 
The author offers a detailed but readable account of the changing 
character of that relationship and of the enduring culture influence 
which the Empire exercised over those nations, from the reign of 
Justinian to 1453. The Avars, Slavs, Bulgarians, Serbians and Croats 
came first as marauders or allies, and some of them decided to make 
their home in the lands of Byzantium. As unwilling hosts, the 
Byzantines tried all the repertoire of their diplomacy to minimize their 
danger: military and marriage alliances, sowing of discord, appeals to 
friendship, empty but resounding titles, conversion to Christianity, 
duplicity, force bribes, trade, pomp and culture. The success of these 
devices was varied. They all converted to Christianity but that only 
insured their allegiance to the Byzantine Church, not to the Emperor. 
They were dazzled by the splendor and the mystique of the Empire, 
but that also whetted the ambitions of Krum and Symeon, John I and 
John II Asen and Stephen Dusan to place the imperial crown on their 
own heads and even though they failed, their attempt cost the Empire 
dearly. Nevertheless, on the whole, the long life of Byzantium proves 
that its diplomatic efforts were not in vain. 
The author also discusses two other peoples whose medieval 
history is likewise linked to Byzantium even though they settled on the 
northern banks of the Danube. They are Hungarians and the 
Rumanian Vlachs and Moldavians. Professor Obolensky holds as 
"almost certain" that the Byzantines were acquainted with the Hunga-
rians since the early sixth century when the latter were settled between 
the Don and Caucasus; the Byzantines had then an outpost in the 
Crimea. Moravcsik thinks that the Hungarians must have been one of 
those Turkish tribes among whom the Byzantine missionaries in that 
area achieved great success. Obolensky doubts that that was the case 
because when the Hungarians first appear in history in the ninth 
century their behaviour is entirely pagan, but he implies that their 
settlement in the Pannonian Plain late in that century had serious 
repercussions in Eastern European history because it drove a wedge 
between Byzantium and the Slavs of Central Europe whom Cyril and 
Methodius had recently introduced to Byzantine Christianity. This 
view, however, has to be revised if one accepted Professor Imre 
Boba's very recent theory that the Moravia of Cyril and Methodius 
was not situated by Bohemia but around Sirmium, south of the 
Danube. Be it as it may, the Hungarians' role in Byzantine history is 
somewhat different from that of the other unwelcomed guests to the 
realm. Called as allies in 859 against the dangerous designs of Symeon 
the Bulgarian, they at the same time discovered in the Balkans one 
more theater for their depredations but, unlike the Slavs and Bulgars, 
they never gave signs of intending to stay there. To this fact the author 
attributes the rather cool reaction of the Byzantines to their raids. 
Their final place of dwelling, in the Pannonian Plain, put them in the 
very frontier of Roman and Byzantine Christianity. In spite of the fact 
that they had been first exposed to the latter, they, nevertheless, chose 
the former. However, Byzantine Christianity remained a powerful 
factor in the Hungarian life, and when the conquest of Bulgaria by the 
Byzantines gave common boundaries to the two nations in question, 
the religious, cultural and political ties between them became even 
stronger. The Hungarians were particularly regarded as valuable allies 
after the dark days of Manzikert and their kings, at least until the end 
of Manuel I Comnenus' reign, viewed themselves as subordinates to 
the universal Emperor of Byzantium. The same Manuel, son of a 
Hungarian princess, and who used the title of Oungrikos, frequently 
intervened in the internal affairs of Hungary and after his last 
campaign there in 1166 had his suzerainty officially recognized by the 
Hungarians. The association of the two countries continued and in the 
fifteenth century, when the Ottomans were readying the death blow 
for the Empire, the great hope of deliverance was placed on the 
redoubtable Transylvanian, John Hunyadi. 
The Vlachs and the Moldavians do not appear in the Byzantine 
orbit until the fourteenth century when they attain their independence 
from Hungary. The author mentions three reasons why they were of 
importance to the Empire: trade, religious designs on the part of the 
Patriarch of Constantinople, and military. The second sounds a bit 
overstated. It was the Vlachs and the Moldavians who first sought 
adherence to Byzantine Christianity as reaction to the Hungarian 
attempt to impose on them the Roman type, and the liturgy that they 
adopted was not the Greek orthodox but the Slavonic. Perhaps this 
latter decision was due to the influence of Bulgaria from where 
Professor Obolensky thinks the two Rumanian principalities probably 
obtained their acquaintance with Byzantine Christianity. 
The author adequately documents his facts without excessive use 
of footnotes. His geographical description of the Balkan area and the 
maps which he inserts at different intervals of the chapters make more 
lucid the historical narrative. His judgment of Justinian and the Slav 
peril, however, may be a little too harsh. Memories of Marathon and 
Salamis may have been in Justinian's mind when he waged war on 
Persia, but they do not seem to have been the determining cause of his 
attention to it to the detriment of the Balkan danger. It must be 
remembered that the first Persian war during his reign was started by 
the Persians who broke off the peace negotiations which his ambassa-
dors were conducting in Persia. It is true that he ordered Belisarius, at 
the same time, to construct a new fortress on the border with Persia, 
but that was not necessarily an offensive measure. Likewise, the 
second Persian war in 540 was started by Chosroes who wanted to get 
access to the Black Sea and used the Byzantine campaign against 
Mundhir as a pretext to start the hostilities. Mundhir, to be sure, was 
a client of Persia, but he had first raided the Empire's lands. All this 
does not mean that Justinian is entirely free of blame for the eventual 
Slavic occupation of the Balkan area. The Ostrogothic war was the 
unrealistic and wasteful realization of a dream which may have 
prevented him from paying more attention to the Danube frontier. 
But still, Justinian was willing to make a negotiated peace in 540 with 
the Ostrogoths, dividing Italy in two; it was Belisarius who frustrated 
his intentions. 
One chronological slip found frequently in chapter 3 is the 
reference to Louis the Pious as the reigning ruler of Germany in the 
860's; the author probably meant Louis the German, since the former 
had died in 840. But these slips do not detract from the outstanding 
merits of the work which is an exhaustive treatment of the intricate 
Byzantine diplomacy with its neighbours in Eastern Europe and in the 
Caucasus region. 
California State University Carlos A. Contreras 
Fresno, California. 
A Budai Var es a debreceni csata [The Budai Var* and the Battle of 
Debrecen], By Ignaz Olvedi. (Budapest: Znnyi Katonai Kiado, 1970. 
Pp. 225. Illus.) 
The literature of Hungarian military history has again been 
enriched. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the ending of the Second 
World War the Zrinyi Military Publishing Co. released A Budai Var 
Ss a Debreceni Csata by I. Olvedi. This book deals with the events of 
the fall of 1944 in Hungary and is based on material gathered from 
German, Hungarian and Russian archives. 
The book is written against the following background: at the end 
of August, 1944 Regent Horthy of Hungary dismissed the government 
led by Sztojay, which was completely under Hitler's influence, and 
asked Geza Lakatos, the loyal, former general of the First Hungarian 
Army, to form a new government. General Lakatos took over the 
direction of the country at a most difficult time. Hungary was under 
occupation by the German Wehrmacht, and on the other side of the 
Carpathian mountains her army lay bleeding. The Red Army which, 
*The Budai Var was the seat of the Hungarian government in 1944. 
after Roumania's declaration of neutrality, was pushing toward 
Transylvania through the southern Carpathians, had arrived at the 
country's borders. Inside the walls of the Budai Vcir the decision was 
reached: the war must be ended. But how? Olvedi devotes the first 
part of his book to pondering this serious question. With this book on 
Horthy's and Lakatos' military strategy, the Hungarians have their 
first glimpse of the enormous difficulties which beset the government 
during that critical time. It was almost impossible for the government, 
during September 1944, to see through the complexities of the internal 
and external military and political situation, and to select the least 
hazardous path along which Horthy's delegates could head for 
Moscow in order to negotiate with Stalin regarding the possibility of a 
Hungarian-Russian ceasefire. Olvedi discusses the Regent's myriads of 
problems, and writes of the 1944 August-September secret talks in 
Bern. As a result of these consultations, the British advised Hungary 
to approach Moscow. The author discusses the many facts of 
domestic politics; documents the intentions and moves of the German 
and Hungarian military and, finally, he devotes space to describing 
the feelings of the population. There is no doubt that the Hungarian 
people, as a whole, dreaded the arrival of the Red Army. Olvedi 
accurately reports the fact that not only the supporters of the govern-
ment and the civil service, but also the military, the intellectuals, the 
moneyed middle class and the "petit bourgeoisie" all supported 
Horthy's moves towards an agreement or alliance with Britain. Thus, 
it was against this socio-economic backdrop that the Lakatos govern-
ment had to make its decisions. 
The second part of the book deals predominantly with the 
military operations taking place on the other side of the Tisza river; 
detailed knowledge of these events was until now limited. 
Of note is the fact that Olvedi devotes equal space to a discussion 
of the Russian, German and Hungarian military hopes and strategies. 
By doing so he manages to bring in a degree of objectivity and avoid 
the traditional one-sidedness prevailing in Hungarian communist 
military chonricles, a one-sidedness which in the past has often 
bordered on servility toward the Russians. 
Olvedi devotes a full chapter to the events of October 15, 1944 
and their military and political consequences. 
Schweizerische-Osteuropa-Bibliothek. Peter Gosztonyi 
Bern. 
The Wind and Beyond: Theodore Karman, Pioneer in Aviation and 
Pathfinder in Space. By Theodore von Karman with Lee Edson. 
{Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967. Pp. 376.) 
The first part of the book was written as an auto-biography by 
von Karman—the outstanding aeronautical scientist—in collabora-
tion with Lee Edson, a journalist. After von Karman's death in 1963, 
at the age of 81, the work was completed by Edson. 
Von Karman was born in Budapest, Hungary, where his father 
was a university professor and leading figure in the reorganization of 
the Hungarian secondary school system. At an early age, he exhibited 
the traits of a mathematical genius and, upon graduating from 
Budapest Technical University, became an assistant professor there. 
Later he resumed his studies at various German and French Univer-
sities and this led to his appointment as professor of aeronautics at 
Aachen University. From 1933 on von Karman was on staff at the 
California Institute of Technology in Pasadena and in this capacity 
was instrumental in the development of modern aviation in the United 
States. He took part in the scientific development of supersonic 
aviation, rocketry and space technology and acted as adviser to the 
U.S. Air Force and NATO during and after the war, respectively. 
Consequently his name has become inexorably linked with a number 
of important aeronautical discoveries. In addition to being a theoreti-
cian, von Karman was also a founder of Aerojet General Corporation, 
the world's largest rocket manufacturing company. 
World wide recognition of von Karman is documented in the 
Appendix of the book which lists 29 honorary doctorates, 10 decora-
tions and orders and 35 awards in testimony to his extraordinary 
contribution to twentieth century science. 
In his private life he was a colourful personality who led an active 
social life. He counted Einstein, Bohr, Fermi and many other greats 
among his friends. He never married and his beloved sister ran his 
household for decades. 
The Wind and Beyond is written in a vivid journalistic style and 
the story vies for interest and suspense with the best science-fiction 
novels. The only regret one feels in reading it is that the author does 
not dwell in more detail on von Karman the man as opposed to von 
Karman the scientist. 
Mississauga, Ontario G. Bethlendy 
Habsburg Otto - egy kiilonos sors tortenete [Otto Habsburg: the Story 
of an Extraordinary Life], By Emil Csonka. (Munich: £jj Eur6pa 
Kiado, 1972. Pp. 580.) 
What happened to the Habsburg dynasty after the dissolution of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire? What has been the life of the first 
Habsburg heir who could not occupy the throne of his ancestors? Emil 
Csonka, a Munich historian, undertook to answer these questions and 
thus to relate the life-history of Otto, King Charles' eldest son, from 
the time he was the heir-apparent, to his recognition as a European 
statesman. 
This well-organized, scholarly work, written in excellent 
Hungarian, will be welcomed by those interested in modern political 
literature. Its topic is not only Otto Habsburg's life, but rather the era 
in which the eldest son of the last Hungarian King was born and 
brought up. 
Otto was forced to leave Vienna with his parents at the age of six 
losing, at ten, his father the Emperor-King while in exile in Madeira. 
He was twenty when, at the request of his mother, Queen Zita, he 
launched a political campaign to regain the thrones of Austria and 
Hungary. According to Csonka, Queen Zita never gave up hope that 
political developments both in Vienna and Budapest would be such as 
to require return of Otto as Emperor-King. The extremely energetic 
widowed Queen worked hard on the restoration of the Monarchy. 
She obtained the cooperation of several outstanding politicians of the 
twenties and thirties and was successful in building up contacts with 
the royalist groups of the Austrian Republic and the Hungarian King-
dom. (After 1918, constitutionally, Hungary remained a Kingdom 
and the prerogatives of the King were exercised by a Regent). 
The course mapped out for Otto by his mother was not an easy 
one. Neither socialist Vienna nor the majority of patriotic Hungarians 
wanted another Habsburg in the Viennese 'Hofburg' or the royal castle 
in Buda. Csonka gives a detailed account of Otto's political career in 
the Europe of the thirties. A royalist restoration is not an easy cause at 
best and is rarely successful. The exceptions were the Stuarts in 
England and the Bourbon King who returned to his throne after 
Napoleon's defeat. Once, very briefly, Otto also came close to 
success: immediately before the annexation of Austria his return was 
a distinct possibility, but Schuschnigg hesitated at the last moment 
and instead of Otto, Hitler marched to Vienna. 
The anti-nazi attitude of the Habsburgs is well-known. Otto 
himself is a humanist, a democrat, and an enemy of dictationships. 
Accordingly, he and his family tried to promote the Austrian cause in 
France, England and the United States during the year of 1939 to 1945, 
but to little avail. The book describes the amazing political ignorance 
of several statesman of the day in European affairs. President Roose-
velt's naivete' and obscure views on Stalin and the Bolshevik system 
are astounding. Otto Habsburg had to fight not only misguided 
Western politicians, but also the intrigues of various emigre groups, 
and particularly those of the Czechs. Benes gave the impression that 
he considered Otto as a greater foe than Hitler, the 'Moravian 
corporal'. An account is given on the tragic fate of the Austrian Legion 
which was dissolved because of disagreements among emigre circles. 
Certain historical facts about Hungary are also reviewed by the 
author. During the war the Kallay government with the consent of the 
Regent, contacted the United States concerning the possibility of a 
separate peace treaty on several occasions. The Hungarian diplomats 
and other public figures living in Washington persuaded Crownprince 
Otto, among others, to support this Hungarian line with Roosevelt. 
Otto undertook the task despite the maltreatment to which he had 
been exposed on the part of Budapest during the previous decade. The 
subsequent exchange of secret messages and letters begun in the 
summer of 1943 did not produce tangible results, although a number 
of somewhat naive promises were made. The book is incorrect in 
implying that Kallay and Regent Horthy promised Otto that in the 
event of a separate peace treaty Hungary would offer him her throne. 
The writer, while working on a Horthy biography, recently discussed 
this question with the late Tibor Eckhardt who stated categorically 
that such a promise was never made to the Crownprince during the 
negotiations of 1943 and 1944. 
Being convinced that Churchill's plan for the setting up of a 
political union between Bavaria, Austria and Hungary fell through as 
a consequence of Stalin's violent opposition, Ot to returned to Austria 
in June 1945. But the man who represented Austrian interests so 
ably during the war was not allowed to remain in his country. The 
Renner government requested him to leave the French sector of 
Austria, where he lived. Although the occupying French authorities 
suggested that he stay despite Vienna's order, the 33 year old Otto 
rejected this offer with the words: "During my whole life I have been 
fighting against foreign interference and infringement of Austria's 
sovereignity. Therefore, I will not accept the help of the French 
occupying powers to remain here". Thus, Otto once more left Austria, 
this time as an adult. 
Emil Csonka gives a detailed account of Otto's life after 1945, 
dealing with his political struggles, journeys, lectures, his marriage 
and financial situation. The emerging picture is one of a highly-cultur-
ed European, a humanist and a democrat. There is no doubt that 
Csonka is biased both towards Otto as a person and towards his 
political aspirations. However, he still manages to chronicle the events 
of an era and the life of Otto Habsburg with accuracy and relative 
objectivity. 
The last chapter of the book, entitled "The Battle for Return" 
deals with the changes in Austrian domestic politics which led to 
Otto 's ultimate return to his country. Numerous pictures and photo-
graphs of historical importance as well as an extensive list of sources 
present the author as an excellent scholar with a wide horizon. A 
detailed index is also attached. 
Schweizerische-Osteuropa-Bibliothek Peter Gosztonyi 
Bern. 
OUR CONTRIBUTORS 
Watson Kirkconnell is President Emeritus of Acadia University. 
Agnes Huszar Vardy is Assistant Professor in the Humanities Depart-
ment at Robert Morris College. 
Peter Pastor is Assistant Professor of History at Montclair State 
College. 
Alfonz Lengyel is the Director of Northern Kentucky State College's 
Classical Art History and Archeology Programme. 


